

DISSOCIATION IN MEDIATION¹

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Abstract: This paper approaches several texts that are part of the so-called discourse of mediation, adopting a pragma-dialectical perspective of the theory of dissociation. It is an attempt to identify the uses of dissociative patterns, with special emphasis on the indicators of dissociation. The paper investigates the various uses of the concept of dissociation as a discursive technique in the argumentation on the different aspects that are involved in international conflict, such as the discussion of the notion of peace. The purpose is to identify the role of dissociation, as a device strategically used by the mediator to help the parties minimize the disagreement space, and come to a conflict resolution.

Keywords: indicators of dissociation; international conflict; philosophical pairs; separation, negation, value clues.

1. Introduction

This paper is structured in two main sections, aiming at illustrating how theory works in practice. Thus, the first section introduces theoretical aspects, regarding the concept of dissociation, as viewed, on the one hand, by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), the first scholars to talk about this notion, and, on the other hand, approached from a pragma-dialectical perspective, mainly represented by van Rees' research (2002, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).

The theoretical points, to be discussed in the first section, enable the identification of the various indicators of dissociation, and of patterns of dissociation, respectively, on the samples of texts, chosen for illustration, with the purpose of establishing to what extent it is an effective technique the mediator strategically resorts to, so as to contribute to the conflict resolution.

The case under analysis is represented by the conflict between Egypt and Israel, mediated by the American president Jimmy Carter. Therefore, the empirical material is made up of several fragments of texts that belong to both the mediator – Jimmy Carter and the representatives of the two conflicting parties – Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister of Israel, and the Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat.

First of all, in order to better understand the context of facts that this particular situation of international conflict involves, a brief definition of the phenomenon of mediation is necessary, so as to clarify the type of mediation this paper deals with.

Mediation is viewed as a process in which a third party – ideally neutral – assists two or more parties in conflict, facilitating communication and offering some guidance in order to help them solve the dispute by themselves (van Eemeren et al. 1993; Jacobs and Aakhus 2002).

The person who mediates is called a **Mediator**. Eemeren et al. (1993: 118), Naess (1966) define him not as a person who necessarily has to solve the conflict, or who must come to a conclusion about the truth or falsity of information, but especially as one whose job is “to regulate communication, manage interpersonal relations, and facilitate decision-making” (Jacobs and Aakhus 2002: 29).

International mediation is the particular type of mediation used in international conflicts. “Mediation at the international level involves interventions by credible and

¹This research has been conducted in the framework of the PN II – PCE – Ideas 1209/185/2007 Project, coordinated by “Dunărea de Jos” University of Galați, Romania, and financed by the Romanian Ministry of Education, Research, and Youth.

competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working toward a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives, and, in some case, the application of leverage” (Fischer and Keashly, 1991: 30).

2. Theoretical framework

This section presents a theoretical framework of dissociation that includes various approaches to this concept. As it is a notion introduced by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the other theoretical views on this subject are formulated function of this ‘traditional’ approach, thus drawing on it, but at the same time departing from it and adding different interpretations to it. M.A. van Rees’s work shifts the perspective of analysis from mainly rhetorical view to mainly dialectical view, investigating its various uses as a technique of strategic maneuvering employed in practical discussions.

2.1. Dissociation with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

As a concept first introduced by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 190) **dissociation**, as a process, refers to those “techniques of separation which have the purpose of dissociating, separating, disuniting elements which are regarded as forming a whole, or at least a unified group within some system of thought: dissociation modifies such a system by modifying certain concepts which make up its essential parts”.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce and discuss the notion of *philosophical pairs*, which result from a dissociation of concepts. Due to the multiple incompatibilities that exist between appearances, the pair “*appearance – reality*” is considered the “prototype of conceptual dissociation”: “While appearances can be opposed to each other, reality is coherent: the effect of determining reality is to dissociate those appearances that are deceptive from those that correspond to reality” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 416).

The two concepts that make up the philosophical pair are called *term I* (“*appearance*”) and *term II* (“*reality*”). Term II can only be defined in relation to term I, being both “normative and explanatory”; “it results from a dissociation effected within term I with the purpose of getting rid of the incompatibilities that may appear between different aspects of term I”. It is a “construction”, and not “simply a datum”, establishing, during the dissociation of term I, a rule function of which the multiple aspects of term I are organized in a hierarchy. The fact that term II provides a criterion, a norm, enables us to make judgments with regard to the presence or lack of value of the aspects of term I. Therefore, in term II, “reality and value are closely linked” (Perelman and Tyteca 1969: 417).

Philosophical pairs following from dissociation are separated (1) from pairs in which the terms are in opposition to each other, of the type good/evil, just/unjust, etc., and (2) from classificatory pairs, which have no argumentative purpose, but merely “subdivide a whole into separate parts”, for example a genus into species. Thus, terms II of the philosophical couple are “related to that which has positive value in the antithetical pair, while terms I ... to that which has negative value” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 422).

Moreover, due to the ambiguity of argumentative situations, the main function of dissociation is to “remove an incompatibility”. This means that each has a certain “conception of reality, a criterion enabling one to penetrate the device (“real arguments”, “reality of the speaker’s sentiments”, “reality of the facts stated”). A conception of reality implies a conception of the device, and vice versa, as in any dissociation there can be no term I without a term II” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 453).

Of relevance for this paper is the special attention dedicated, in the *New Rhetoric*, to the linguistic elements that may signal dissociation. It is a discussion about the way in which term I is distinguished from term II by means of “characteristic expressions” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 436), such as adjectives (“apparent” or “real”) or adverbs (“apparently” or “really”), based on the idea that such adjectives and adverbs derived from nouns that make up philosophical pairs can further on generate other dissociation processes. Other indicators, which confirm that we are dealing with term II, are the use of the definite article, the demonstrative, capital letters, or the presence of the expression “properly so-called”. Term I is announced by noun prefixes, such as “pseudo”, “quasi”, “non”, called “disqualifying prefixes” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 437-8). The concluding remark is that “Term II is that which is authentic, true, real”, while “term I designates an imaginary entity, an illusory construct, an inadequate theory”. Other indicators, for example the use of the word “claim”, or the quotation marks a word is set between, also show that term I is involved. “Mention of a substitution often signals the presence of a dissociation” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 439), the example illustrating the way in which term II is taken as what is only term I: “*The intellect always substitutes its own representations, constructions, and opinions for true knowledge.*”¹

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 441), in each philosophical pair, term II “indicates what serves as a criterion of value, whereas term I indicates that which does not satisfy this criterion”.

There are also expressions that may trigger dissociation without specifying the way in which it is to be effected, thus dealing with an implied dissociation, judging by the linguistic context. Such expressions mentioned in the *New Rhetoric* are the devices known as apparent tautology, negation of a term by itself, identity of contradictory propositions. An example of such an expression is “a penny is not a penny” in which the repeated word has two different meanings, thus a dissociation being implied into terms I and II. The opposition of meaning between a word and what is generally regarded as a synonym for it may involve dissociation. The example from Pagnol supports this idea: “*I do not mind dying. But it grieves me to depart from life.*”²

As it can be seen from the linguistic elements it is associated with, and from the particular aspects it involves at the discourse level, dissociation is viewed as having an effect on the discourse itself, since it operates on the notions used in presenting an argument. Thus, the means of persuasion used as rhetorical devices are considered “artificial, formal, and verbal” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 451), being associated to terms I of the pairs *artificial – natural*, *form – substance*, *verbal – real*, whereas the spontaneous, unprepared speech, though imperfect, is considered the norm, being associated with term II of the pairs.

2.2 The pragma-dialectical approach to dissociation

van Rees’s theory of dissociation, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, is based on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept of dissociation, but it is also a more profound investigation of this concept, viewed in connection to the pragma-dialectical notion of strategic maneuvering. Thus, in her analysis she deals with several aspects linked to dissociation, among which a discussion of possible indicators of dissociation.

In this type of approach, van Rees in line with other authors (Grootendorst 1999, Gâță 2007a) brings evidence against the treatment of dissociation as an argumentative scheme

¹ Shri Aurobindo, *Oeuvres complètes*, III: *Le guide du yoga*, p. 186, cited in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 439).

² Pagnol, *Cesar*, p.24 cited in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 443).

(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969), viewing it as a technique that helps at solving a difference of opinion, and whose “argumentative potential is based on the fact that the two concepts resulting from the separation of the original notion are portrayed as non-equivalent: the one is represented as more important or more essential than the other” (van Rees 2005a: 383). Consequently, dissociation involves a unitary concept expressed by a single term, that is “split up into two new concepts, one subsumed under a new term, the other subsumed either under the original term which is redefined to denote a concept reduced in content, or under another new term with its own definition, the original term being given up altogether” (van Rees 2005a: 384). The example she provides in this sense (preserved from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) refers to the famous unitary concept of law split up into two new concepts “the letter of the law” and “the spirit of the law”.

In Gâță’s view (2007a), dissociation allows the speaker to de-construct and then re-construct notions by generating or by giving the illusion to create (fresh and new) knowledge and by thus redefining and / or modifying the audience’s and / or the opponent’s experience of the world.

Van Rees (2003) provides a comprehensive definition of dissociation in terms of three features:

“1. from an existing conceptual unit, expressed by a single term, one or more aspects are split off; 2. through this operation a contradiction or paradox is resolved because now a proposition can be considered true in one interpretation of the original term and false in the other; 3. the reduced and the split off concept are assigned a different value.”

To each of these three features, a set of clues that trigger dissociation corresponds: separation, negation and value. The author adds that none of these clues are clear indicators that unambiguously lead to the use of dissociation. Still a combination of the various classes definitely indicates the presence of this argumentative technique.

1. Clues of *separation* – “from a single unitary concept one or more parts or aspects are separated and are brought under a different denominator” (van Rees 2003: 888). Van Rees offers as an example of such a separation a context in which “jury sports” are distinguished or separated from “real sports events”.

- (1) Jury sports **must go back to** the circus, ice show, or freak show. Everything is all right, as long as we are delivered from them during the real sports events. **Sports are sports except** jury sports, another word for unfair. Jury sports are sometimes quite nice to watch, but they **shouldn’t be made into** competitive games (*De Volkskrant* 15-02-2002 cited in van Rees 2003: 888).

Words such as “except”, or the modals “must” and “shouldn’t” function as indicators for dissociation by means of which sports are explicitly separated from the concept of competitive sports: “sports are sports except jury sports”. Van Rees (2003: 888) considers the sentence represents “a quasi-definition of sports, through ‘except’ separating what does not belong there”. Despite the differences established by van Rees (2003) between dissociation and the similar concepts of precization, definition and distinction, their presence in context, signals, nevertheless, the use of dissociation. These are also clues for dissociation because they are employed with the purpose of clarifying the new meaning or content of a term after being dissociated. The example provided by the author is a fragment from a newspaper article in which the notion “nationality” is split off into “cultural” and “constitutional nationality”.

- (2) We **should precizate** the image of the Dutchman: there is a difference between our cultural and our constitutional nationality (*De Volkskrant* 16-03-2002 cited in van Rees 2003: 888).

An explicit precization is performed by the use of “**we should precizate**” before making a distinction between the two aspects of the Dutch nationality.

Precization in its turn can be signaled by the use of “a reference to the possibility that a term can be interpreted in various ways” (van Rees 2003: 888). All references to precization or definition can serve as explicit indicators for dissociation: “to precizate” “in the meaning of” or “in the sense of”. Van Rees offers as an example a fragment in which the indicator “in the sense of” triggers the presence of dissociation, characterizing one of the terms of the split off concept of “fraudulent declaration”.

- (3) Bolkstein earlier did place a rectification in VN. In this, he says: ‘I meant “fraudulent declaration” **not in the technical sense of the word, but in the sense of** cooperating in giving a patently false impression of things with regard to my tax declaration’ (*De Volkskrant* 13-11-1999 cited in van Rees 2003: 888).

The idea of “confusion” between two aspects of a notion also involves precization. The example she provides refers to an explicit confusion between the terms “genetically identical” and “identical”, with the aim of supporting the fact that human cloning should not be allowed as it leads to identical people. A precization, thus, eliminates the confusion between the two elements.

- (4) The discomfort at cloning of humans seems to me to be the product of **confusion between the notions** ‘identical people’ and ‘genetically identical people’ (*De Volkskrant*, 11-04-1997 cited in van Rees 2003: 888)

Another set of clues for dissociation refers to words and expressions which introduce a distinction: “distinction”, “difference”, “not the same as”, “something else than” (van Rees 2003: 888). Van Rees classifies these indicators into two main categories: explicit and semi-explicit. She also adds to these, the implicit distinction, where only the result of a process of dissociation is visible. Here, van Rees mentions paradox (“She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain”), tautology (“You’ve got beer and you’ve got Grolsch”) or opposition of synonyms (“the difference between pleasure and delight”). Nevertheless, she states the fact that only the first two types are considered as true indicators.

Explicit distinction occurs when “the speaker or writer separates so many words that a distinction must be made” (van Rees 2003: 888). The example of explicit distinction provided by van Rees is taken from a newspaper article in which the concept “allowing the violation of legal regulations” is split up into two different concepts: “tolerance” and “anticipating a change of law that everybody thinks should be put into effect”. The trigger of this dissociation is the indicator “is something quite different from” which in pragma-dialectical terms represents a usage declarative, a speech act by means of which a precization or clarification is performed³.

- (5) According to Jorritsma, the cabinet will not revert to a tolerance policy, as it was applied in 1997. ‘That was once, but never again, we said at the time. But tolerating **is**

³ For more on usage declaratives see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 109-110).

something quite different from anticipating on a change of law which everybody thinks should be put into effect' (*De Volkskrant* 22-01-1998 cited in van Rees 2003: 888).

We talk about a semi-explicit distinction when dissociation is not achieved by a usage declarative but by being “presupposed and as such referred to” (van Rees 2003: 888). The example to illustrate this second type of distinction is also taken from a newspaper article in which the concept of “sponsor” is separated into “solid”, “bona-fide financiers” and “opportunist sponsors”. The lexical element “the difference” introduces the self-evident idea of separation.

- (6) The insurance company is a solid sponsor, that has been financially supporting skating as a sport for a quarter of a century. (...) Apparently Blankert doesn't recognize **the difference** between bona-fide financiers that have built sports and opportunist sponsors (*Algemeen Dagblad* 19-02-2002 cited in van Rees 2003: 889).

2. Clues of *negation* – are those indicators that introduce an opposition in relation to dissociation. These derive from the role of dissociation “to resolve a contradiction or paradox. The speaker asserts that a statement in which a term occurs is true in one interpretation of that term and denies its truth in another interpretation. Through this denial, dissociation functions as a critical technique” (van Rees 2003: 889). In this category the author includes: explicit (“it is not a question of”) and semi-explicit (concessive and replacement “but”) indicators of dissociation. Such an example of explicit use of an indicator of negation is the expression of denial “it is not a question of”, which introduces the unitary concept “bar on public speaking”.

- (7) (...) The spokesman for national Rail, though, says that **it is not a question of** a bar on public speaking for personnel, but the agreement is that personnel encounter the press through public relations officers appointed for the task (*NRC Handelsblad* 08-01-2002 cited in van Rees 2003: 889).

Van Rees talks about the combination of “but” with negation, distinguishing two types: the concessive “but” and replacement “but”.

In the case of *concessive* “but”, which serves at introducing a concession, the negation follows the connective; “the speaker agrees with the statement that he criticizes in one of the dissociated interpretations, but not in the other” (van Rees 2003). An example of concessive “but” is identified by van Rees in “*She loved beautiful clothes but was not vain*” in which the speaker agrees with one aspect of the dissociated term and disagrees with the other aspect.

The *replacement* “but” is used to replace one statement with another: “the negation preceding the connective, the speaker rejects the statement that he criticizes in one of the dissociated interpretations, and replaces it with a statement in the other interpretations” (van Rees 2003). An example of replacement “but” is identified by van Rees in “**not** in the technical sense of the word, **but** in the sense of cooperating in giving a patently false impression of things with regard to my tax declaration” or in “**not** a question of a bar on public speaking, **but** that the agreement is that personnel encounters the press through public relations officers that have been appointed for that task” (van Rees 2003).

Van Rees considers that in cases when explicit or semi-explicit indicators are missing, one should carefully study the context for finding clues about a contradiction or paradox that is resolved.

3. The *value scale* clues – correspond to the third feature listed above, which involves “the fact that two dissociated concepts are valued differently. The one is considered more important or essential than the other” (van Rees 2003: 890). Following Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), van Rees includes among the expressions that signal dissociation “real”, “pseudo” or “true”. She provides the same example given for separation, that refers to the dissociation between “jury sports” and “the **real** sports events”, which is signaled by the use of “real”. Another example is the dissociation between “sponsors” and “**opportunistic** sponsors” the former term being qualified as positive, the latter as negative.

On the same line with the *New Rhetoric*, the author introduces the notion of pairs: “essential – incidental”, “central – peripheral”, “real – pseudo”, in which the notion considered *central* is the unmarked term, and the *peripheral* is the marked term. Van Rees argues that “often a second value scale is applied to the two members of the dissociated pair, in which the one member is valued as good, the other as bad” (van Rees 2003: 890). Not always the term viewed as essential or central is assigned a positive value. Consequently, the peripheral or incidental terms may be valued positively and the central or essential terms may be valued negatively.

Van Rees takes from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca the pair theory-practice. Expressions such as “in theory” vs. “in practice”, “theoretically speaking” vs. “practically speaking” function as indicators of dissociation. An example of dissociation signalled by the indicator “practically speaking” is found by van Rees in a dialogue in which the practical implications of a policy are separated from the unitary concept of policy, the former term being more highly valued than the latter:

- (8) D: practically speaking, really, I don't see my way through it
 B: but, OK, that is practically speaking, how do you view it er, (.) policy wise? (van Rees 2003: 890)

3. The strategic use of indicators of dissociation in the argumentation used in mediation

First of all, as we are dealing with a verbal exchange in which a third party is involved, the analysis presents such indicators of dissociation employed by the two conflicting parties – Israel and Egypt – on the one hand, and by the mediator, on the other hand.

As mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper, being a pragma-dialectical approach, this analysis follows the classification of indicators, as discussed by van Rees (2003). There are cases in which the dissociation is explicitly performed and triggered by the different types of indicators, but there are other cases, in which this process remains partially unexpressed, and therefore, we have to fill in the missing parts – in this case, of course, we are no longer speaking about real indicators, but merely presupposed.

As already shown by Degano (2007: 371), in real use, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish whether we are dealing with a process of separation, negation or attribution of different values, “as it is often the case that more than one process is in progress”. On the same line, the indicators are better analyzed if organized around patterns of meaning, but I have chosen to present them typologically, for the sake of demonstration and exemplification.

3.1 Indicators of separation

First of all, the one who uses strong indicators that signal the use of dissociation is the mediator, President Carter (March 16, 1977), who defines the starting points of the two parties. Thus, the term “difference (of opinion)”, together with the modal operator “must”, in close relation to the adjective “strong” are employed by the mediator with the aim of defining the different points of view with regard to the establishment of borders.

- (9) The second one is very important and very, very difficult, and that is the establishment of **permanent** borders for Israel. The Arab countries say that Israel **must** withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines; Israel says that they **must** adjust those lines to some degree to insure their security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab countries on the one side and Israel on the other.
But borders are still a matter of great trouble and a matter of great difficulty, and there are **strong differences** of opinion now.
[...] agree to negotiate...an **honorable** solution to the **differences** between you.

Dissociation is used by the parties, as well, and the idea of separation between the two terms of the dissociative pair is introduced by various expressions or words that function as indicators. Prime Minister Begin stresses the importance of a peace agreement: *This is a historic turning point in the fullest sense of the term.* Also, in trying to explain to Americans “the **difference** between the *Presidential* regime and the *parliamentary* regime”, he formulates the idea as an aphorism – “*We are the servants of the Knesset and not its rulers.*” The idea of difference(s) between what the two conflicting parties want is emphasized by the use of such clues for dissociation:

- (10) [...] *there were differences of opinion within all the parties.*
[...] *on this issue, too, our views differ.*
[...] *should differences of opinion arise between us, we will clarify them like civilized peoples...*
President Sadat knows...that our position concerning permanent borders... differs from his.

President Sadat also brings into discussion the matter of differences, considering them not a reason serious enough for a peace agreement to fail: “*Many months...wasted over differences*”, “*On the meaning of security we differ*”, “*...settle our differences on the table..*”. These recurring words and expressions show the common interest and commitment of the parties to solve the dispute. These words are strategically used, according to the pragma-dialectical framework, in order to move the situation toward resolution.

3.2 Indicators of negation

Negation is a strong indicator used by President Carter to explicitly mark the distinction between “all the nations of the world” and America in terms of the degree of trust. At the same time, dissociation is employed by the American president to define America’s role and mediating position in this process of peace agreement.

- (11) *I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good offices. I think it’s accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that’s most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we’ll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.*

This idea of America as the most trusted nation is emphasized by means of the concessive element “but”, which, together with the negation “not” expresses an opposition of synonyms – *most* and *completely*. At the same time, these linguistic elements function also as indicators of value, America being attributed positive connotations by its ability of gaining the trust of the parties. The definition of America as a *catalyst* is strategically employed by Carter with the purpose of reducing the differences between Israel and Egypt.

Another use of the negative pattern is that from the speech on March 14, 1979, by means of which Carter dissociates between the state of war before starting the negotiations, which is assigned negative value, the negative element being embedded in the meaning of the noun “hostility”, and the state after America’s involvement, assigned positive value:

- (12) For more than 30 years the nations of Egypt and Israel, who have been and who will be perpetual neighbours, have existed in a **continual state of hostility**. That hostility has exploded into combat four times and each war has brought with it suffering and pain and the loss of life, renewed fear and hatred and great danger for that entire region and for the world far beyond. **But** in the last 16 months the way has finally been opened to peace. When I decided to make this trip, the peace negotiations - as you know - seemed to have reached a stalemate. After long hours of discussion in both Egypt and Israel, proposals were made for resolving all the outstanding issues.

The opposition between past and present is strategically used by Minister Begin with the same aim of continuing negotiations towards a resolution of their conflict (September 28, 1978):

- (13) What makes this night **different** from all other nights? From all the days, evenings, and dawns? **In the past** there were battles, and then we signed armistices but the state of war continued. We signed interim agreements and yet the state of war with all its implications continued. **But on this night** we are discussing the signing of a peace treaty which begins with the following words: ‘The state of war between Israel and Egypt has come to an end.’
That is the first sentence of every peace treaty.

Therefore, the past is assigned negative value, while the present offers a solution to ending the state of war, which means seeing the future in a positive light.

Another structure implying negation is used by Begin with the same purpose of persuading the members of the Knesset to follow the course of negotiations, no matter what the costs are, admitting that a “new era” of peace and “fundamental change” involve sacrifices as well.

- (14) I call upon everyone, irrespective of faction, to unite and vote, favour of this motion which spells the beginning of a **new** era in Israel’s history. **Not** that there are **no** difficulties **no** pains, **no** decisions, **no** agonies. **But** the great hope for a **fundamental** change is what faces us. Let us unite and close our ranks. We **must** accept the good together with the bad - and I do **not** say that there are risks or that sacrifices will have to be made, but the main point is the end of the state of belligerency with the largest and strongest of the Arab states.

This thesis, expressed in the opening stage, is further on argued about in the argumentation stage, thus dissociation being used by Begin with the aim of strategically persuading its

people of the rightness of the course of action Israel should pursue in the attempt to come to peace agreement.

- (15) If Egypt steps out of the vicious circle of wars, Syria cannot attack us because she knows that to do so would be tantamount to suicide, and the Hashemite king would lose his crown. The circle of wars has been closed.

President Sadat, as well, resorts to an opposition that implies the negative element and ‘but’, with the strategic aim of making the opponent see their common purpose for peace, and to assure the other party that he will not resort to manipulative strategies: “*Not to maneuver or win a round **but** for us to win together...*”

Sadat’s discourse contains an extended structure of the ‘yes, but’ type of distinction, which serves to make a concession. The first part of the structure – the ‘yes’ sentences in which the speaker takes full responsibility by the use of assertions, for the past actions, which are negatively valued, is set in opposition (by means of the conjunction ‘yet’ interpreted as ‘but’) with the present and future attitude of the Arabs, under the form of a declarative. The purpose is that of expressing the common goal for peace achievement as Israel, supported by the sincerity-value construction: *in all sincerity*.

- (16) You want to live with us, in this part of the world.
 In all sincerity I tell you we welcome you among us with full security and safety. This in itself is a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change.
 We used to reject you. We had our reasons and our fears, **yes**.
 We refused to meet with you, anywhere, **yes**.
 We were together in international conferences and organizations and our representatives did not, and still do not, exchange greetings with you. **Yes**. This has happened and is still happening.
 It is also true that we used to set as a precondition for any negotiations with you a mediator who would meet separately with each party. **Yes**. Through this procedure the talks of the first and second disengagement agreements took place.
 Our delegates met in the first Geneva conference without exchanging a direct word, **yes**, this has happened.
Yet [‘but’] today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice. We do **not** want to encircle you or be encircled ourselves by destructive missiles ready for launching, **nor** by the shells of grudges and hatreds.

3.3 Value indicators

Of the three types of indicators mentioned by van Rees (2003), the value scale indicators are the most predominant in the discourse of international mediation. The reason is that this particular type of discourse, which necessarily involves the concepts of peace and war, also implies some value scales – positive and negative values, inherent in the meanings of words and expressions grouped around these two semantic fields.

The value scale involves pairs such as essential / incidental, real / pseudo, in defining the major concepts of this type of discourse that involves the problem of war: peace, security, relations, autonomy, and democracy. Different values are assigned to the terms involved in this process of dissociation, which gives this technique a highly argumentative potential.

On an abstract level of dissociation, we may claim that peace (as we believe the good is the basic genuine value) may be split off into two other terms. On the one hand, there is peace in the pure sense of the term, which involves a state of calmness and tranquility and the absence of hostilities and war. On the other hand, there is another kind of peace that cannot be attained without a state of war, that is, war is viewed by some cultures as necessary in order to obtain peace. Therefore, we may say that the value scale is imbedded in the culture of a people. This means that what is perceived as valuable for some people may prove not / less valuable to other people, to put it in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) terms.

As stated in the beginning of this analysis, different types of indicators may be used with reference to the same dissociation pattern. Such an example was analyzed above, in which the indicators of negation and of the value scale have occurred together. This "combination of clues" for application of a value scale and of clues for opposition of synonyms, functions, according to van Rees (2003: 891), as a strong indicator of dissociation.

The value scale involves pairs such as essential / incidental, real / pseudo, in defining the major concepts of this type of discourse that involves the problem of war: peace, security, relations, autonomy, and democracy. Different values are assigned to the terms involved in this process of dissociation, which gives this technique a highly argumentative potential.

There are clear indicators such as "true", "truly", "real" or "really", used by the three speakers with the aim of stressing the positive value the treaty of peace is invested with and their attitude of commitment to the resolution of this conflict. Therefore, according to the very definition of dissociation, the new term obtained by dissociation represents the criterion, the norm, and is valued the more – "true peace", "permanent peace", "real and not just a sham peace" (negation expressing the idea of opposition), "comprehensive peace", terms formulated by the mediator. Other types of indicators mentioned by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) are also present in Carter's discourse to signal dissociation: the definite article – "the peace", or the demonstrative – "that peace that is so ardently desired by the people whom they serve", "no goal is higher than that of genuine peace", "we may work together successfully to make this peace".

The same dissociative patterns are used by the parties as well, which emphasizes their common goal for peace. On the one hand, the value indicators are present in Begin's discourse, corresponding to the terms in the pairs apparent / pseudo / real, or the pair theory / practice: "bring peace to our nations – real peace", "...if we achieve peace, true peace...", "true, full peace with absolute reconciliation between the Jewish people and the Arab People", "Really the contents are already agreed on.", "...the chance is practically in our hands" (theory / practice pair), "the full right to settle / the absolute right to settle in all parts of Eretz Israel", "The simple truth is that president Sadat looked for no ruse", "I believe that this is the right choice...".

These value scale clues enable the parties to define their starting points and the positions in the agreement settlement. Thus, for Begin, "the true meaning of the Camp David agreement is this: Autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, Jews and Arabs living together in Eretz Israel, and security for Israel and all its citizens.", while Sadat resorts to rhetorical questions that resume the problems to be dealt with in order to define peace: "How can we achieve a durable peace based on justice?", "As we really and truly seek peace we really and truly welcome you to live among us in peace and security".

By an extended structure of dissociation, Sadat establishes a difference between "interim peace", or "partial peace", and between "permanent peace", "durable and just peace" "based upon justice", the norm or criterion being represented by the latter series of terms. The

Egyptian president uses the technique of dissociation to strategically maneuver the situation. He reasonably argues that a peace achieved without coming to a “just solution of the Palestinian problem” does not bring “durable” peace. Thus, from the topical potential he chooses the argument of rightness invoked by the use of ‘justice’ or ‘just’, which weigh heavier on the value scale, and the rhetorical devices, such as the repetition of the words “partial”, “permanent”, “durable” peace “based on justice”, which precisely serve his rhetorical and dialectical aim. Therefore, the rhetorical effect is to induce the same belief on the part of the audience, while, dialectically, he wants to move the situation towards reaching a resolution that involves solving the Palestinian problem as well, and implicitly the whole conflict.

- (17) How can we achieve **permanent** peace based on justice? Well, I have come to you carrying my clear and frank answer to this big question, so that the people in Israel as well as the entire world may hear it....
[...] An **interim** peace between Egypt and Israel, or between any Arab confrontation state and Israel, will not bring **permanent** peace based on justice in the entire region.

Rather, even if peace between all the confrontation states and Israel **were achieved in the absence of a just solution of the Palestinian problem**, never will there be that **durable** and **just** peace upon which the entire world insists.

Second, I have not come to you to seek a **partial** peace, namely to terminate the state of belligerency at this stage and put off the entire problem to a subsequent stage. This is not the **radical** solution that would steer us to **permanent** peace.

Equally, I have not come to you for a third disengagement agreement in Sinai or in Golan or the West Bank.

For this would mean that we are merely delaying the ignition of the fuse. It would also mean that we are lacking the courage to face peace, that we are too weak to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of a **durable** peace **based upon justice**.

I have come to you so that together we should build a **durable** peace **based on justice** to avoid the shedding of one single drop of blood by both sides. It is for this reason that I have proclaimed my readiness to go to the farthest corner of the earth.

According to Walton (2005), in order to persuade, we attribute a term positive values, see it from a different perspective, and thus reformulate it, giving sometimes the impression that our new perspective does away with the negative properties that the respective term may imply. Walton (2005: 169) argues that when there are interests at stake, there is an obvious battle over the definition or the key term at issue, where “the rhetorical aspects of the persuasive definition are visible”. Such happens with these terms involved in the context of international mediation – ‘true peace’, for example. In our case, the parties offer a new definition of a term that already has an established lexical meaning, trying then to defend the definition as representing the “true” meaning or “real essence” of the term (see Walton 2005: 168).

As Zarefsky (2006: 405) suggests, there are “essentially contested” terms, which acquire meaning only dialectically, in relation to their opposites, that is, they do not have fixed meanings. This makes possible the use of persuasive definitions. Such happens, for example, with the term “normal” as in “normal relations”, used by both the mediator and the parties to define the relations once the peace treaty is concluded. The fuzzy boundaries of meaning of the term “normal” allow the speaker (the mediator in our case, as in the example above) to

actually negotiate its meaning and take advantage of its favourable connotations in the context of this particular situation.

4. Concluding remarks

This paper has presented the way in which the concept of dissociation as understood by various scholars can be applied to the analysis of texts that make up the discourse of mediation. To this aim, the paper presented first some theoretical aspects regarding the framework of dissociation. Then these issues were applied and discussed in close relation to the texts I have submitted for analysis. Thus, on the basis of the identification of the three classes of indicators of dissociation, a discussion was made about the way in which these indicators signal the presence of dissociative structures, and about the function they have within the whole discourse.

By the use of dissociation that implies redefinition of the major concepts involved in arriving at a peace situation, the three parties attribute new meanings to 'peace', 'democracy', 'territory', in accordance to their own systems of values and beliefs. The mediator's main role is to take out the common elements of both conflicting parties, and come up with a new structuring of these concepts, a process in which, again, he makes use of dissociation.

The conclusion is that both the parties involved in the conflict and the mediator, as well, resort to this technique with the purpose of coming to a solution of solving the conflict, of reducing the disagreement space that exists between Egypt and Israel.

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