

NARRATIVE IDENTITY, INDIVIDUAL AND COMUNITY

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Abstract: From a phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view, individual identity can be defined, as did Paul Ricoeur, as constructed narrative identity of the "capable man" which is able to say, to do, to tell and to recount himself: to say sometimes involves telling stories or recounting about what you did, and both such manifestations are forms of "action" through which the self-consciousness is shared to others. Thus, this "selfconstruction" consisting either in self recognition in national and universal pre-existing models or in the cultivation and development of autobiographical characteristics to which we can not however give an absolute sense, can not ignore the results of interaction with others, with one community or another, in multiple relations. In this context, for example, we could formulate the following questions: national identity of an individual (structured at the beginning by the time and place when and where he was born) or of a state (here, the Romanian state structured by major national and international events starting with the modern history of Romania) might be affected during a geopolitical game that changes its rules, at least the last two centuries, within an interval of about fifty years? If the notion of national identity has a political dimension and it is able to be applied both to individuals (in terms of civic, if not civil) and to community – the transnational identity, such as, for example, European identity is an individual identity or a collective one? Is the "global" identity (i.e. the European identity) a substantial one, or it remains a simply one of postmodern narratives? These are some current questions on personal, national and global sizes of identity that my paper aims to examine.

Keywords: identity, narrative, selfconstruction, national, global.

Hypothesis

From a phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view, individual identity can be defined, as did Paul Ricoeur, as constructed narrative identity of the "capable man" which is able to say, to do, to tell and to recount himself: to say sometimes involves telling stories or recounting about what you did, and both such manifestations are forms of "action" through which the self-consciousness is shared to others.

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Individual and community □ from identity to alterity

Although the discovery of otherness phenomenon dates back to the dawn of history and explains in a certain way the difficulty of peaceful relations establishment between different people, the theorizing of the concept of “otherness” in a couple with the “identity” represents a specific postmodern approach.

Tributary to the Aristotelian philosophical tradition in logical and ontological issues, during modernism the definition of identity is marked by Leibniz, to reach Heideggerian phenomenology and hermeneutics. And this latter – we can add – , by the concept of “difference” brings into discussion the problem of otherness. According to Heidegger, the concept of “difference” plays an important role in defining identity and it will be assumed by the “weak thought” (Vattimo), privileging cultural connotations, psychological and political implications of this concept in postmodernism. Beyond traditional ontological logic paradigm, “identity” is a concept used in theoretical contexts highlighting the specificity and difference in someone or something inherent to an individual or a community. However we resume the idea to emphasize that this implies recognition problem centered reflective on “hermeneutics of the self” (Foucault), but at the same time “excessively politicized” (Ricoeur) in terms of multiculturalism. This latter aspect favors “a indefinite claim, figure of 'bad infinity’” for emotional, legal and social recognition of minorities, while affirming the true meaning of self-recognition of personal identity comes with “the establishment of a speaking subject”¹.

Whether we stand in essentialist paradigm (the “objective” one) or that conventionalist (the constructivist, “subjective” one) concerning identity, it is possible, of course, that others see us quite differently than we all perceive ourselves, and in turn us, to look at a another perspective the others than that in which they occur themselves.

And then, beyond the political or ethical-legal aspects of recognition, the alterity question is related to what H.G. Gadamer called a “hermeneutic behavior”, i.e. an attitude towards the neighbor starting from the meeting each other for the other, by going through comprehensive identification with another (by virtue of a “sympathetic understanding” of the interpreter to the subject such as Mircea Eliade says), in order to lead from the acceptance of “foreignness” of the other, to the “revelation” of personal alterity.

According to H.G. Gadamer, our identity in relation with alterity is best expressed in the definition of the divine as eminently “something else” (*der ganz andere*) by Rudolf Otto².

If such an approach that aims the metaphysical and mystical side reaches the “otherness” component of the self, this is even more obvious in a historicist approach such as that of Ortega y Gasset. Suitable the Spanish philosopher, the man may be in a “alterity” relation to itself because human reality is changeable, because “the human being is always distinctly and another”³. Moreover, we can speak of a perpetuation of the human species alterity, because human nature is history “whose substance is precisely the variability”⁴. Actually, history remains a “strong” expression of radical alterity, namely the “human alteration”. On the other hand, in the light of history identity appears as a complex construction, for while man is a “memory’s capitalist”, history is “reminiscence’s capitalism”⁵.

¹ Paul Ricoeur, *Parcours de la reconnaissance. Trois études*, Paris, Édition Stock, 2004, p.146.

² Hans Georg Gadamer, “Moștenirea Europei” în *Elogiul teoriei. Moștenirea Europei*, traducere de Octavian Nicolae și Val Panaitescu, Iași, Polirom, 1999, p.134.

³ José Ortega y Gasset, *Europa și idea de națiune*, traducere din limba spaniolă de Sorin Mărculescu, București, Editura Humanitas, 2002, p.136.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.133.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p.144.

But despite the historical memory that retains the idea of difference, today, as shown in a recent study, our report to another, either another country, or another race or other sex has completely changed. Rather, Western societies have reduced the reality of the otherness (what is the radically different into another) through colonization and cultural assimilation.⁶ In Marc Guillaume's conception, in these phenomena is looming the decline of radical alterity, traditionally understood as "unacceptable, incomprehensible and even unimaginable side"⁷ of the other – either foreign or immigrant or marginal.

On this planet which barely keep "remnants of exoticism", in which differences are treated in a "industrial" way, figures of radical alterity are produced by even the social and technological "familiar" environment: delinquency, drug dependence, terrorism, "intelligent" and autonomous machine, genetic chimera, space shuttle. Furthermore, the technology produces figures of absolute otherness, it provides the possibility to search for other civilizations and maybe even meeting their people beyond the imaginary spaces of science fiction novels and movies.

The ability of technology to produce otherness had noticed still Berdiaev. For human life detached from nature and immersed in the social life, simultaneously with the development of a "planet earth feeling" is for the Russian philosopher deeply "unbalanced". In addition, the "autonomous power of the technique is the ultimate expression of the kingdom of Caesar, its unprecedented form". And the "dualism of God's kingdom and the kingdom of Caesar takes more acute forms" since "the kingdom of Caesar does not recognize the existence of neutral spheres, it is conceived in a monistic manner"⁸.

But the technique remains just be "capitalized" by memory as a complex figure of radical otherness productivity in modern times, while postmodernism, beyond the consumerism which facilitates globalization configures (sometimes terrifying) the information technology as an argument of the discourse on self reflection in something else that is human, and also foreign to him.

The „Hyper-real world of communication” about which speaks Baudrillard, where our understanding is composed of countless "images, interpretations and reconstructions circulated by the media in competition with each other and with no central coordination" (Vattimo, apud David Lyon)⁹, in its turn, translates the decline and confusion of the radical alterity: whom or what can us afford to not recognize if these images represent the way of being transparent of the "world sociability"? From you recognize in the viewer more or less shivering by what is happening on the small screen until you recognize in the victim, it would be an ethical huge leap. Because otherwise, the radical otherness and it will be disclosed in face of death: only *the other* dies in a "hyper-real" way, witnessed and abandoned even at that moment by a lot of viewers.

Not only the life is dissolved in television, in movies or on the internet (especially on social networking sites) as in the "hyper-real" world of Baudrillard or in the "cinema-vision" of Lipovetsky and Serroy¹⁰, but also death loses its "identity" in such a world. Every day we get news about victims of accidents, attacks or natural disasters. These information are part of the everyday life, of the "banality of evil" (Hannah Arendt) expressing shallowness, indifference, emotional and ethical mediocrity of modern man which even no longer strives

⁶ Marc Guillaume, „Introducere” la Jean Baudrillard, Marc Guillaume, *Figuri ale alterității*, traducere din limba franceză de Ciprian Mihali, Pitești, București, Editura Paralele 45, 2002, p.7.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p.6.

⁸ Nikolai Berdiaev, *Împărăția lui Dumnezeu și Împărăția Cezarului*, traducere din limba rusă de Nina Nicolaeva, București, Editura Humanitas, 1998, p.39.

⁹ David Lyon, *Postmodernismul*, Traducere din engleză de Luana Schidu, București, Editura Du Style, 1998, p.89.

¹⁰ Gilles Lipovetsky, Jean Serroy, *Ecranul global. Cultură, mass-media și cinema în epoca hipermodernă*, Traducere de Mihai Ungurean, Iași, polirom, 2008, p.305.

to be a hypocrite. Of course, while some are always or stay alive, closer or farther away from them, other people die. Our inability to imagine "the multiplicity of simultaneous destinies" like Cioran says, or "the incapacity to live otherness as destiny" as Baudrillard would say, probably maintain the survival instinct.

On the other hand, "consumption, communication, transport and mass urbanization forces billion others to cohabit (...), to exchange without having to do each other, to meet without confront"¹¹.

And then, why don't we judge ourselves as one another? For, as were observed "the judgment insists (...) on otherness" and, in fact, "it does not really applied than the other, neighbor, i.e. someone who is different from us, while being our equal"¹².

Perhaps precisely in order to restore an equilibrium, to to achieve respect for our own identity, we should recognize that: "We must learn to respect the other and what is different. Related to this is the fact that we must learn that we can not have the right point of view. (...) Maybe it's an advantage that Europeans could and had to learn more than the inhabitants of other lands, to live with others, even if others are different"¹³.

Technological development may itself call into question the issue of Stoic cosmopolitanism discovered and theorized by Kant¹⁴, in the "citizen of the world" or "citizen of the universe" formulations. This "trans-political" attitude that changes the perspective on radical alterity "figures" may be fed by space technology, by information technology, having a transformative effect on international relations and also, on supranational relations between people, on the relationship between identity and otherness.

Regarding the derivation of otherness from the political status of the individual, from the citizen's quality - we can say that even this is not entirely foreign to the cosmological and ontological perspective on the subject. For one is to be a citizen of a state that sent spacecraft into space, another is to be a citizen of a third world country. Technology and the "faith" in its possibilities, in the power that it holds - can change the perception of the world and of the universe at the most fundamental sense, and thus makes us different¹⁵.

Without taking into account the class differences (also universal) which operates as a factor of otherness, beyond that in principle the status of citizen confers uniform political "identity" for all members of a modern state, we can note that otherness is revealed and concealed at the same time by the status of citizen especially in the case of the integration of various membered in a group, in the case of incorporation of different groups within a national community, or in that of integration of citizens together with their states in the European Union, and by extension in the international community.

The difference can be experienced also and in a collective manner, "in situations where personal relationships have to doubled by tolerance policy"¹⁶, but "divided postmodern selves seem to be parasites on unitary groups of origin, which forms the cultural basis, as it were, of their selfconstruction"¹⁷.

¹¹ Marc Guillaume, *op.cit.*, p.8.

¹² Jacques Philippe Leyens, Prefață la Vincent Yzerbyt, Georges Schadron, *Cunoașterea și judecarea celuilalt. O introducere în cogniția socială*, traducere și de Denise-Carmen Burducea, Iași, Polirom, 2002, p.11.

¹³ Hans Georg Gadamer, *op.cit.*, p.134.

¹⁴ In 1784 Kant published *The Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht)*.

¹⁵ A few years ago, during an evening walk with a cousin who had emigrated to the U.S. in 1978, I have remarked a bright star in the sky, considering that this was the "Evening Star". My cousin contradicted me, claiming that celestial body is an American satellite.

¹⁶ Michael Walzer, *Despre tolerare*, traducere de Areta Voroniuc, Iași, Institutul European, 2002, p.81.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p.80.

Not only cultural and "natural" identity become alienated at the level of citizenship, but also the citizen himself alienates from the group of origin. When the "other" can no longer accept the status of otherness, by refusing his "objective" identity (whether deemed it "shameful", marginal or because he built another subjective one), when the others hypocritically pretend not to notice the difference disfavoring that puts the "alien" in a situation of inferiority - acceptance takes place by virtue of the fact that there is only a vague "myself" predisposed to recognize the difference rather than to specify the identity: „if we are all strangers, then no one is a stranger. For as long as we don't accomplish a strong identity, we can not recognize any alterity. A foreign companionship would be no more than a group of the moment, existing only in opposition to a sustainable community. If there were no such a community, there is no such companionship. We can imagine the state officials 'tolerating' the foreigners postmodern; penal code would establish tolerance limits and nothing else would be needed"¹⁸.

At this level of discourse the precise notion of citizenship and that prospective of otherness dissolve both into a vague notion of humanity. This could be the condition of "citizen of the world" mediating between identity and otherness, a factor of integration in a community and a wider civilization, by the permanent dynamic and perfectibility that this status entails better understood from the perspective of technology before which the biggest challenge remains sky.

Eventual universal citizenship status would enhance our humanization? What would then be the perception of "radical otherness" of the extraterrestrial, for example?

Common sense tells us that the *other* may be not only radically other, but also the measure of inner civilization's achieved by an individual or a group. Actually the other represents our objectified image: understanding him through his quality of the "else" and at the same time as our *alter ego*, listen, view, accept, possibly take care of him, help, understand his suffering suspending ourselves phenomenological, if it is necessary and despite the current blind individualism - could be the reason of being in this paradoxical postpostmodern age, growing together with globalization and technologization, the individualism and the self-consciousness of sovereign rights, to the detriment of others.

From the Christian point of view, the solution of the problem of alterity (more or less radical) consists in the principle of self-recognition in the other. The commandment (moral and even more than that) of love for the neighbor, summarizing the amount accomplishments and infirmities of human restoration.

For the modern man, the other if it is not personalized remains an abstraction or an indication of our hypocrisy humanitarian. Or, the commandment of love also means an humble exercise of self-recognition in another individual (either the humblest one), the acceptance of the possibility that "me" could be anyone else, the awareness of a sense of existence in fact of reporting to the other which could be translated in a "Cartesian" manner: I think the other, so I exist.

This is a "trans-political" perspective, beyond information technology and international and supranational relationship between people as a relation between identity and otherness.

As the very identity is established by making personal and collective memory through a discourse that chooses its own symbols and thematic areas, I consider that the creative hermenutic method can be used in the analysis of a subjective phenomenon as one of the self-perceived identities and the perceived identity by others. This is especially true if the creative dimension and confident dimension meet. The purpose of any hermeneutics of trust is to understand each other, by a generous internalized process of recognition of the

¹⁸ Michael Walzer, *op.cit.*, p.27.

validity of other possibilities of being. It consists of enjoying individual details of other ways to understand reality. The great art, the creative force of hermeneutics is seen at the time of “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer, 2004).

The narrative identity in the confrontation with others

On the other hand, a contradiction appears when we make theoretical generalizations on “personal identity”, since there are at least as many identities, as there are individuals. Even if they largely identify themselves with anthropological discourses on the identity of their time, each person has a proper “discourse” on self and existence □ whether or not it gets marked as an expression of the unique unrepeatable style of their life, as happens with creators.

This is because the essential and unique “identity” is the very thing that makes us different one from another; each perceives, thinks, externalizes and speaks about their identity in his own way; we cannot impersonate, except in cases of personal, social or political pathology; there is not a type of man, whether new or old, but only different people, even if everyone recognizes himself in a part of a “universal soul”; if the self-definition does not represent a goal of existence, identification with a higher being or idea becomes the tendency for all human beings to think about these, sooner or later.

According to Ricoeur, is the capable man who can build a personal identity □ by its specific narrative language, different from other’s.¹⁹ So, he builds personal story of his own perspective, beyond or together with the symbolic or metaphorical language of religious and artistic creations, beyond or together with the conceptual language grounded in phenomenological philosophy.

The notion of personal identity, of course, is related to the “inner man”, with his immortal essence, with the person. On the other hand, it is a truth that does not need to be demonstrated that the characters which writers creates, are immortal “beings”. In this case, the identity of a character as some of his characteristics and the identity of capable man who creates that character/personage, are reflecting each other, without having to replace one with other.

The capable man is the one who can externalize and say something of the inner man as creator of character that he built with his own abilities. Also, the reader can learn from the example of character/personage while the author/capable man can to understand, and thus he is able to build his own history, his own subjective identity. And such a history as subjective identity does not involve to build an unrealistic identity (like Emma Bovary, for example), resulting from the addition of features specific to a fictional character of another person.

By building and by telling his story, the narrator not only becomes aware of itself, but he is also known by others. The construction of a history can consist in the act of telling, but it can also be an aspect of “*the rule of metaphor*”, of the life passing through the story and of the narrator’s life which pass with the story. This can take many forms □ from mythology, through history, literature and imagery, until philosophy, as, for example, the story of the idea as a phenomenology of consciousness, as it is shown by Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica in the a book containing “tales on human being”, specifically about human consciousness, starting from Hegel’s conception (Noica, 2009).

¹⁹« autrement (...) met en mouvement (...) une problématique entière (...) celle de l’identité personnelle associée au pouvoir raconter et se raconter ». « J’ai proposé le terme d’*identité narrative* pour caractériser à la fois le problème et la solution » - Paul Ricoeur, *op.cit.*, p.152.

Identity construction by the narrator also involves the temporal dimension, because the personal identity, only considered over time, can be defined as “narrative identity“. The “selfhood” (or “self-reflexive”) called «ipséité» by Ricoeur, also reveals its historical dimension, different from the logical dimension, but not outside of it. According to a “hermeneutics of the self”, the idea of narrative identity provides access to a new approach to the concept of “selfhood”, which, without reference to the narrative identity, is unable to deploy its dialectics, i.e. the report between two kinds of identity, namely the identity of the immutable “same” (*idem*), and the mobile identity, “*ipse* of itself“. By this “dialectics”, the narrative identity can be considered in its historical condition”²⁰.

The overview of the problem is accomplished also from Ricoeurian’s narrative point of view by evoking another dialectic than that of “*idem*” and “*ipse*”, namely the “dialectic of identity faced otherness” which introduces (as it is already shown) the question of the relation between private identity and public identity. Thus, “a story of a life is mixed with that of others”²¹.

Therefore, personal identity becomes a narrative synthesis between the individual level and the collective level of identity. The “status of the collective memory in the light of individual memory” is the expression of “capacity to memory” and it belongs “to all subjects which found their lexical expression in any of the personal pronouns”. So, the whole community is allowed to say “we” on the occasion of special operations of remembering. On the other hand, the narrative identity reveals its fragility in the confrontation with others. Either in the case of an individual, or of a community, the narrative identity reveals its fragility²².

And this fragility is manipulated by ideologies of power, through symbolic mediations of action. These are mainly based on the resources which the variation of narrative configuration provide, “telling otherwise“ and in this regard “identity temptation“ consists in the fold of identity- *ipse* on the identity-*idem* ²³.

Only uncorrupted memory can restore personal identity or a collective identity as near as possible to the truth, and the capable man is able to make this hermeneutic and phenomenological exercise (in the sense that suggests Ricoeur in his work).

From the phenomenological point of view, the narrative identity is configured using memory as a “province of the imagination” as it’s shown in another book of Ricoeur, i.e. *Memory, History, Forgetting (La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli)*. Here Ricoeur describes how one can build identity with the memory itself: the phenomenology of memory deliberately opens on an analysis which is oriented towards object of memory “that was before the mind“. Then it passes through the stage of the quests of memory, of the history, of the reminder. Finally, phenomenological approach passes from the given memory to reflective memory, the memory of oneself.

The common problem that concerns both the phenomenology of memory, the epistemology of history and hermeneutics of the historical condition is “the representation of the past“ and also, according to Ricoeur, “the egological problem”.²⁴

²⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *op.cit.*, p.153..

²¹ *Ibidem*, p.155.

²² *Ibidem*, p.156.

²³ *Ibidem*, p.157.

²⁴ « En bonne doctrine phénoménologique, la question égologique - quoi que signifie *ego* - doit venir après la question intentionnelle, laquelle est impérativement celle de la corrélation entre acte (« noèse ») et corrélat visé (« noème). In good phenomenological doctrine, egological issue - what it means *ego* - must come after the question of intent, which is imperative that the correlation between act (“noesis”) and correlate target (“noema”). Le pari pris dans cette première partie consacrée à la mémoire, sans égard pour son destin au cours de l’étape historiographique de la relation au passé,

This is an approach in the spirit of husserlians phenomenology, whose heir is Paul Ricoeur. In this context Ricoeur formulates the problem of personal identity and collective identity as follows: “These two questions are asked in the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology. If we say too fast on my memory that is myself at first person singular, the concept of collective memory can figure only as an analog concept, i.e. as a foreign matter in the phenomenology of memory. To avoid the closure in an useless aporia, then the attribution's question of the act of remembering to someone □ and thus, to all grammatical persons – must be suspended, and we have to begin with the question "what?"”²⁵

What we should say, is that we may keep the memory of things that we consider important, but from the perspective of the others on the image of ourselves, it is possible that these latter shall be negligible. Even if subjective identity is true, to be sure of its validity, by intersubjectivity, it must be confronted with the image of the other about us.

It is certain that identity is defined not only as a result of self-perception, it is not only the consciousness of “I am I, and if I am, I cannot be another one at the same time and under the same ratio”, but as a image of the “other” who observes from the outside, whether or not actual encounters the reflected “object”.

But each person has his own perceptions and memories, and some of these are difficult to accept by the others. In fact, the problem of personal identity as a narrative identity may be meant as a possible answer to the question: “What people think of themselves?”. And this answer reflects one side or the other side of identity's issue in the story of the adventure of own consciousness.

In brief, according to the idea of Paul Ricoeur, the fall in history means that every individual and every community must build its own identity using the narrative. Concerning “the processing of a narrative”, Slobodan Markovic showed that “In its strict meaning, a narrative is defined as a temporal semantic structure which provides different kinds of information. Narratives have two levels—story and discourse. At the story level the information about real or imagined events is explicitly denoted and transmitted. (...)On the other hand, the discourse has an expressive function; it adds affective or connotative meanings to the information provided by the story”²⁶

The story contributes to the construction of the subject's identity. The construction of a final definition for the identity of the person is located at the convergence of collective identity (with its national, social, civil, civic components) with personal identity. The latter can be psychological or cultural identity that is made up by adopting a status, by subjective choices and attitudes, by building self; it can be self-recognition in pre-existing models or, conversely, it can be self-recognition in the strictly autobiographical characteristics that capable man recounts.

est de pouvoir conduire aussi loin que possible une phénoménologie du souvenir, moment objectal de la mémoireThe challenge made in the first part dedicated to memory, without regard to its fate during the historiographical stage of the relationship to the past, is to drive as far as possible a phenomenology of memory, object-time memory » - Paul Ricoeur, *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oublié*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil. 2000, p. 3.

²⁵ « Ces deux questions sont posées dans l'esprit de la phénoménologie husserlienne. (...)Si l'on dit trop vite que le sujet de la mémoire est le moi à la première personne du singulier, la notion de mémoire collective ne peut faire figure que de concept analogique, voire de corps étranger dans la phénoménologie de la mémoire. Si l'on veut éviter de se laisser enfermer dans une inutile aporie, alors il faut tenir en suspens la question de l'attribution à quelqu'un - et donc à toutes les personnes grammaticales - de l'acte de se souvenir, et commencer par la question "quoi? " » - Paul Ricoeur, op.cit., p. 2.

²⁶ Slobodan Markovic, “Components of aesthetic experience: aesthetic fascination, aesthetic appraisal, and aesthetic emotion”, *i-Perception* (2012) volume 3, <http://i-perception.perceptionweb.com/fulltext/i03/i0450aap.pdf>, pp.7-9.

In the community, the capable man is the citizen and this status is related to the issue of recognition and identity, as they are analyzed by Ricoeur, because at the level of citizenship is reflected capable man's feature of action (agency), defining his status by the "story" of rights.²⁷

Concerning „Citizenship and Identity”, other authors as Engin F. Isin and Patricia K. Wood notes that “in terms of differences, citizenship is more of a concept of status than identity”, while “identity is a concept that presupposes a dialogical recognition of the other; it is a relational concept. But it is also a concept that presupposes identification in the sense that individuals recognize attributes or properties in each other that are constructed as identical or at least similar”²⁸.

Regarding the dialogical recognition each other, as well as Taylor, Ricoeur emphasizes the importance of the reception in narrative construction own to capable man, but the method by which it is debated, adds a political dimension to the phenomenological act. In this respect, the individual identity, the national identity or the global identity, beside their real substantiality shares a fascinating narrative dimension.

²⁷ «(...) sous le vocable de l'appréciation et de l'approbation, la reconnaissance-attestation cède la place à des formes de justification éthico-juridiques mettant en cause l'idée de justice sociale, comme on le verra avec l'idée la plus avancée de “capabilités”, que je dois à l'économiste Amartya Sen et que l'auteur met directement en couple avec l'idée de droits dans l'expression complexe *rights and capabilities* (ou *rights and agency*). Ce couple conceptuel remarquable constituera la forme la plus élaborée de capacités sociales (...)» - Paul Ricoeur, *op.cit.*, pp.199-200.

²⁸ Isin, Engin F. , Wood, Patricia K. (1999), *Citizenship and Identity*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., p.4.