

The historical roots of the concept of opinable

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Abstract

This study proposes conceptualizing the idea of opinable as a vector of convergence for the idea of opinion, for the idea of opinion, for the idea of consideration, for the idea of faith (in the main sense of consideration) and for the idea of appreciation. The founder's historical background is revealed in what Xenophan, Parmenide, Protagoras, Plato and Aristotle call doxa (opinion).

Keywords: opinable, opinion, consideration, faith, appreciation

1 Beginnings

The problem with terms that can reduce antinomy persuasion vs. conviction is the bipolar problem: doxa vs episteme, (opinion / science, truth), feeling vs. reason. This apogee appears at the very beginning of the philosophical reflection: Xenophan, Parmenide .(Sisko, 2015; Медведев & Федотова, 2015), Plato, and Aristotle. The term doxa is of Greek origin: it comes from doxis, doxesis. The equivalent of "doxa" in Latin is "opinabilis" which comes from the verb "opinions" ("have an opinion", "opina"). According to "Oxford Living Dictionary": O "Opinable" is a two-way adjective: "1. That is a matter of opinion; not certain; debatable, conjectural. Also occasionally as noun Now mainly archaic. 2. That is the object of opinion; capable of being consulted or held as an opinion. rare ". The Latin "opinabilis" "was in exact translation" doxaston "(Schwab, 2017, p. 48).

2 The first Greek thinkers

The first Greek thinkers realized that man is more than his science, that he has an unknowing part that still means knowledge. They found that apart from a certain rationality of logos, man lives for reasons that, without being irrational, are lacking stringency, rigor, and strictly probable validity (Mihai, 1989; Martin, 2014; Cordero, 2015; Castagnoli, 2016). The rational does not exhaust the human. According to Aristotle, it can be said that logic does not exhaust thought (Cruz, Troyano, Enríquez, Ortega & Vallejo, 2013; Saracco, 2016). Beyond science, the first thinkers have discovered a profoundly humanistic field: the viewer. They first totally rejected it, then transposed it into a methodology that would evade its hardship, violence, and seduction to subdue it to the jurisdiction of the logos. The situation of this area will be exactly plated by Plato in "Euthyfron". Incipient philosophers assimilated the perception of sensation. They considered both of them marked by relativism as inferior forms of knowledge. The Pythagoreans trigger the process of removing opinion from insignificant. They operate a detachment of sensory, recognizing a subtle rationality.

In essence, the Pythagoreans are the ones who originally pronounced themselves for conditioning the scientific discourse by a demonstrable discourse object and by a certain method (demonstration). Unable to maintain the coherence and cohesion of the demonstrable within the bounds of definitive strictness, they allow the viewer to be inserted into the scientific.

At the same time, Heraclit ruled for ostracizing personal opinions and validating only common opinions of all those consensus opinions.

Ultimate rehabilitation of the opinion is done by the Sophists. They separate it from sensory, recognize its autonomous nature and give it the status of a fortress. However, she does not enjoy autotest, she is influenced by emotions and other opinions. It is not imposed by its own power, but by the power of rhetorical

procedures. Opinion is the matter of rhetorical techniques. Knowledge of opinion is never certain, it is at the limit of appearance and the domain of verosimil. Appearance envelops the world, opinion is one of its instruments. Within the limits of opinion, true science can hardly be established. This is the doctrine of the sophists. The rhetoric they state is used to handle verosimil effects. What verosimil is real and what is real as opinion is verisimilous. Gorgias is the only sophomore who, without hesitating for the insightful rhetoric of the jurist, recognizes his limits extensively. It recognizes them in order to rehabilitate the opinion. He maintains that opinion leads people, despite the fact that it has only fragility and instability, imprecision and indeterminacy, so anyone who uses it, and no one can isolate it, conquers only shaky positions. The Rhetoric manages the sand castles on the moving sands (Achricesei & Boboc, 2016).

Plato will experience the disappointment of miserable opinion, which explains his doctrinal aversion (confined in "Gorgias", "Sophist", etc.) to the insidiousness of rhetoric, as the sophists used it. He will oppose his doxa - episteme, the science of rational thought. Science has as its object ideas, the real existence. The opinion lies in the shadows, the appearance, the illusion, the deceitful deceiver. An opinion does not cling to the dignity of science, but in any case has some cognitive distinction, for it is more than any ignorance. And as knowledge is beyond ignorance, any opinion carries some knowledge, one that provides the intermediation between ignorance and science. When Socrates, as a "character" (as G. Deleuze tells him) is the ignorance and the science of ignorance, showing that he knows he knows nothing, he reveals the sadness of the opinion that brings the contradiction. The field of cogitative bitterness as the state of the underlying reflection is even the field of opinion. A land of degradation makes Plato out of opinion. But it also creates the possibility of salvation in wisdom. Philosophy removes disciples from appearances, it allows them to evade simple and unstable opinions. The viewer is not a cogitable state, doxa does not announce epistems (Ellway & Walsham, 2015; Keddell, Stanfield & Hyslop, 2016; Hess, 2016; Silva, 2016; Barnard, 2016; Goldstone, 2017). Understanding this, opinion appears to be something between a stage of knowledge and a form of ignorance. Opinion does not formulate either knowledge or ignorance, it is. Its being is the appearance. The rhetoric of opinion is the rhetoric of appearances. Keeping in mind, however, that language brings about knowledge, we can today claim that knowing knowledge is irrepressible. At the time of the evolution that he represents during Plato's time, opinion can not be revealed to the limit of our intellectual horizons but that opinion does not exist as knowledge. Plato remains in the history of the viewer through the irrecoverable doxa-episteme segregation. With him, the opinion reaches the lowest point of his existence, comes into contact with nothingness, being essentially a essence of appearance. Opinion is held as a low level of knowledge. In science, science can not be lifted, for it only exists as an innocent attachment of cogitation to its immediate projects and capabilities. The Platonic

opinion has its starting point in a sensitive record. This evidence may not be experienced by anyone else who is on other personal, theoretical and practical reasons. The opinion thus gathers itself as an ephemeral experience, scientifically unusable. With this Platonic charge, opinion will rise in faith and will then constitute a step in gnoseology. By criticizing the sophists, Plato and Socrates have made them more visible by entrusting them with at least three ideas:

- restraining the object of knowledge to an opinionable one;
- establishment of a method of advancement and foundation of the advisor: argumentation;

- a clear delimitation of rhetoric.

In his turn, Aristotle preserves the scale of gnoseological values, but changes positions: the episteme remains primordial, doxa ascends from the Platonic shadow to practical appearance. Neither Aristotle offers love to opinion, although it can be said that closer to his soul is "Rhetoric," not "sophisticated rejections." Plato points out that there is no criterion capable of simply resolving an agreement on good and evil, justice and injustice. Man does not have an exact tool in checking the relationships between the contradictions that divide the value range. The interpretative lesson of his master, Aristotle, translates it into the space of dialectical thinking as the thought of the undefined logos. He understands that dialectical thinking is caught in the game of truth and falsehood, as between yes and no. The play of dialectical deliberation between the two poles is tormented by the powerlessness of which one can not go out. Dialectic turns out to be vulnerable when it focuses itself on practicing life. Everyday existence is devoid of a tekhne that regulates axiological agreements. Practical life is a domain of confusion, we understand today. The vague of practical life finds its perfection in consensus. The axiological truth is consensus, material truth is correspondence, practical truth is useful. We see how all the theories of truth appear in Aristotle. The axiological truth will be theorized in the argumentation within a burnt rhetoric. The syllogistic demonstration will end in *ars dialectica*.

The intuitions of the Platonian dialectics and the Sicilian rhetoric born as a legal-procedural justification and grasp of goodwill, Aristotle synthesizes them in a rhetoric that keeps control of its theoretical irradiations. Here, too, the experience of inducing belief, using seduction, ambiguity, and polysemy of terms is concentrated. There is no lack of awareness of the validity of the approach that opposes the truth sophistically, and it is on the slope of mistrust. The "Socrates Platonician" had gained the concern of agreeing on the meaning of concepts, as well as the conceptual relativity that language in its normal functioning induces. If Plato discovered as a solution to rhetorical failure the dialectical dialectic, Aristotle synthesizes the path in a dialectical rhetoric. It draws on two requirements. First, Brahiliogy Exigency: Through the Answer Question Question, the tendency of spreading to ambiguous terms is amortized. The vocabulary is immunized to the context. Seduction becomes

unusable. Macrology is prevented by a narrow dialectic. Within this, reasoning advances sequence with sequence. The unconvincing answer does not allow a new question. Each step must be proven and confirmed by the agreement of the interlocutor. The post-factum protocol of restricted dialectics prohibits the passage to a new sentence without ratification of the old one by the interlocutor adherence. Each link can thus enjoy the coexistence of a truth (Ellway & Walsham, 2015; Keddell, Stanfield & Hyslop, 2016; Hess, 2016; Silva, 2016; Barnard, 2016; Goldstone, 2017).

The second requirement is macrology. It is developed as an extended dialectic, because it is based on the elasticity of the vocabulary used. The value of the terms is left to the context. The adherence of the audience is achieved through the diversity of the means used and the overall induced effect of the thesis. No matter how solid the arguments are drawn in the dialectics of scroll, they do not rely on macrology.

Their only obligation is to support each other. As far as the debts to the receiving consciousness are concerned, the style is tempered by procedures that emphasize the nuances attenuate the brutal senses (Simon & Dejica-Cartis, 2015; Malek, Muhammad, Rosmaini, Alaa & Falah, 2017). Psychological seduction is also accompanied by an organic logical reinforcement. If brahilog is defined by the diadem, macrology is individualized by the extent of the audience. The line of speech must take into account the massive nature of the recipient and the variety of opinions of those who make up the crowd. Overall, the aristotelian rhetoric, based on doxa, focuses primarily on the persuasive valences of each element and only in the alternative on a persuasive technique automatically. This arsenal of rhetorical influence is fixed on an ethically specific basis. The psychological and dialectic are ethically modeled Aristotle. For Aristotle, according to V. Florescu [207, p. 50], the rhetoric "is an antistrophic of dialectics, meant to extend the domination of the logos and the domain of the viewer (values, beliefs, appearances, verosimil)". On the other hand, beyond the argumentation based on opinion, Aristotle configures the demonstration under two scenarios: a) logical demonstration to support evidence and brahilog; and b) rhetorical demonstration supported by macrology and psychological transparency of logic, verosimil, values, beliefs). In the case of the demonstration, Aristotle points out, the method used is silogistic, and in the case of argumentation, the rhetoric.

According to V. Florescu (1973, p. 51), Aristotle's argumentation, means of captatio benevolentiae and seduction through artistic form of discourse are only "necessary", not honorable. As for persuasion, he defines it as non-demonstrating probation that does not generate conviction, but can achieve results as solid as obvious evidence. Moreover, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle set a direction of disdain for reporting. Dispersion for opinion is only a disproportionate reaction to eternal dissatisfaction. Unable to reach the untouched ideal as the ideal of rigorously accurate

knowledge, valid for everyone, valid anytime and anywhere, the cognitive spirit following this obsession of human thought undeservingly discredits opinion. Man is not totally a rational being. When he establishes an ideal of pure rationality, he makes it sanctioning himself as essence. Through practical knowledge, the cognitive spirit, marked by the inadequacy of a limited ideal, struggles to hold an absolute truth. From this wrath for epistemes, doxa goes unjustly. The admiration for epistemics makes a hatred for doxa. The order of history is respected in history. For example, in the Stoics, the authentic philosopher was considered the one who respected the maximum "non-opinions". Do not think, that's the dream of philosophy (Cernicova, Dragomir & Palea, 2011; Jarvis, 2016; DeBo'rah, 2016; Frunză, 2017a; Frunză, 2017b; Renea, 2017). We see him in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, we find him as a word of order in the Stoics, we meet him in the philosophy of Latin, in the compulsive form of advancing on the pejorative nuances of the semantic load of the lex of "opinion". The peak moment of the opinion nightmare will be Hegel who will say that there are no opinions, philosophical opinions (Hegel, 1963, p. 23). Among the few in history who inclined to the idea that the dream of non-opinion would be desirable to fail is Isocrates. We encounter paradigmatic propensity to form reasonable opinions that would be preferable to the uselessness of accurate knowledge (Apud Florescu, 1973, p. 42).

3 Conclusions

An argument for the sentence of sanctioning the opinion is also the fact that there is no study dedicated to it or, in general, the domain of the opinionable person. In relation to the quality of the actual opinion of social and individual consciousness, the mentioned lacking acquires an unsatisfactory dimension. This necessity of developing a "picture of the categories of opinions" (Florescu, 1973, p. 42) can be amortized only within the framework of the antinomy of persuasion vs. conviction. The practice of social, political and religious life, advertising, manipulative, seductive enterprises are the concrete field of opinion development (Sandu & Frunza, 2017). Opinion is not strange to us, the dream of not being conscious is an exhausted dream. The practice of opinion lies at the center of the electoral body investigations and commercial clientele that financial colossals such as Gallup execute on demand. From here you can not take the step back.

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