

## ADORNO AND PHILOSOPHY AS SNOW WHITE

**Ovidiu-Marius BOCȘA**  
North University of Baia Mare

*Abstract: Since Gorgias of Leontini to postmodernism, there had been many attempts to change both reality and man. Some traces are alive in man's purposes. We may see the instrumental rationality and the significant rationality at work between the search of happiness and moral skepticism. The aim of this paper is to observe that the term "acceptable" is referring to the essential need of our spirit and soul. The term deserves a new dignity as concept of our selected encompassing. Why has man never stopped at the Acceptable? What is beyond the Acceptable? Maybe we find ideals, utopias and idols. It is everything we gather round about our acts having illusions as results. Man's fate is in direct connection with the distance from his own choice, the horizon of expectation for something else than all that we let to fill it at random. As common sense if we may discover the Acceptable, why don't we reject the unacceptable? Could we construe such a habit – in which reason itself follows the same pulses of agreeing or rejecting - of living our truth (a kind of spiritual experience): both epistemic and ethical, based on our given existence as it is?*

*Keywords: Communicativity, communicability, communicative ethics, ethics of resistance, rationality.*

### INTRODUCTION

Gorgias of [Leontini](#)<sup>1</sup> is one of the most provocative voice of the antiquity who proves the philosophical seduction. His challenge sounds in amazing terms: "Nothing exists; even if something exists, nothing can be known about it; and even if something can be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. Even if it can be communicated, it cannot be understood."<sup>2</sup> Actually, even if we take this as an ordinary exercise of rhetoric, it still covers space and time of our culture and civilisation, because he visited the territories of existence, knowledge, communication and interpretation and pointed out the paradoxes whose keys would eventually open the whole philosophy's heavens. Indeed, a whole history is

<sup>1</sup>Greek sophist (c. 485 – c. 380 BC), possible pupil of Empedocles, seen nowadays as representative of extreme pessimism and a radical skepticism that finally ends in nihilism. "This kind of nihilism is developed as a belief that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated". See: *Filosofia greacă până la Platon*, vol II, 2nd part p 447-523 trans, introductions and notes A. Piatkowski and I. Banu, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, București 1984 or <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorgias>; also: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/gorgias>; also: Jarratt, Susan. "The First Sophists and the Uses of History." *Rhetoric Review* 6 (1987): 67-77.

<sup>2</sup> Known better as Gorgias' trilemma, it "develops three sequential arguments in *On Non-Existence*: first, that nothing exists, second, that even if existence exists, it is inapprehensible to humans, and third, that even if existence is apprehensible, it certainly cannot be communicated or interpreted to one's neighbors." See: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorgias> <http://users.wfu.edu/zulick/300/gorgias/negative.html>; also: Consigny, Scott. *Gorgias: Sophist and Artist*. Columbia: [University of South Carolina Press](#), 2001

developed around these ideas looking for the meaning of the Acceptable itself. In his history –as Aurel Codoban<sup>3</sup> observes in *Semn și interpretare*<sup>4</sup> –the Occidental philosophy acted through its problems as it would try to reply Gorgias: First Greek philosophy had as theme ”that what is”, the arche (ἀρχή), thus the principle. Then, modern philosophy had as theme the knowledge, emphasizing the role of idea. Nowadays (postmodern) philosophy stated we could communicate, but the only reality was the sign. They appeared three main concepts: the thing, the idea and the sign. From existence, reality, Being, knowledge and meaning there is a long journey having numerous stations in which representative thinkers were tempted by Absolute, case of Augustinus and Thomas d’Aquino (and all the Fathers of the Church and Apologets, especially of Middle Age). G.L. Fonsegrive, in his *Essai sur le libre arbitre* (1887) summed up that the different pro and contra theses had emphasized that: a) The Absolute does not exist and cannot be thought (case of Prothagoras, Epicurus, Hume, Stuart-Mill, Auguste Comte etc) b) There is the Absolute but it is uncomprehensible (Hamilton, Mansel, Herbert Spencer etc) c) The Absolute is thought but it is not real; d) The Absolute is real and inteligible (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel).<sup>5</sup> There is also a long way of the acceptable: case of Berkeley assuming that ”to be is to be perceived”; case of Kant whose knowledge means to build the world ; case of Schopenhauer, whose real world is ”the world as will and representation”. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were under the temptation of the being and becoming as well as Kant and Hegel saw the great adventure of the spirit in building its own world, while ourdays, the world became ”a world of the significations”, in which the language has common roots with behaviour.

### 1. BETWEEN ”ETHICS OF RESISTANCE” AND ”COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS”

Yet, d’Holbach explained that without an acceptable as territory of his liberty, the soul of man either became withered or revolted. Adorno following Kant keeps under suspicion the instrumental reasoning. In *Minima Moralia* and in the posthumously published lectures on *The Problems of Moral Philosophy*, Adorno construed his ‘ethics of resistance’ as a kind of explanation on that we ought not to cooperate with or adjust our life to the ”universal fungibility”. Adorno emphasizes the human mistakes are socially sedimented as “instrumental rationality” because a kind of institutionalised pattern that keeps people out the real freedom or push man to anarchy. He estimates intelligence itself is a moral category, thus the true rationality ought to be the place of moral value. Adorno speaks about a kind of historical and contingent rationality. belonging to Enlightenment with its scientific and technological knowledge that enable man to control and to manipulate external nature. So, rationality and reasoning having the meaning of domination became obsessively accumulation of knowledge useful for mastering the external world<sup>6</sup> It is a sophisticated journey into practical lifeworld as it appears under the normative space described in terms of fundamental moral obligation as

<sup>3</sup> Aurel Codoban (b.1948) specialist in semiology, hermeneutics and history of religions, professor at University ”Dimitrie Cantemir” and [University ”Babeș-Bolyai”](#) of Cluj-Napoca.

<sup>4</sup> *Semn și interpretare (Sign and interpretation)*, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2001p.5-8

<sup>5</sup> Anton Dumitriu, *Homo universalis*, Ed. Eminescu, 1990, p.66

<sup>6</sup> DA 9-48.

Adorno subtly expresses because Hitler has imposed on mankind: "to order their thought and actions such that Auschwitz never reoccur, nothing similar ever happen."<sup>7</sup> Adorno emphasizes the human mistakes are socially sedimented as "instrumental rationality" because a kind of institutionalised pattern of unfreedom. Adorno (following Kant) keeps under suspicion the instrumental reasoning. He estimates intelligence itself is a moral category, thus the true rationality ought to be the place of moral values. His ethics of resistance presupposes the virtues of responsibility (*Mündigkeit*), modesty and affection as well as Adorno's own life is an example, because his destiny did not cover resignation and a model for quietism.

Karl-Otto Apel<sup>8</sup> uses a "complex and multi-dimensional framework"<sup>9</sup> in which are put at work both the dichotomy of [Wilhelm Dilthey](#)<sup>10</sup> and ideas from the so called "interpretive sociology"<sup>11</sup> in the context of communicativity<sup>12</sup> and communicability<sup>13</sup>. In both the cases (for Orient and Occident) there are to be observed the givenness and a better understanding of the Acceptable by starting with the moral judgments and the moral acts belonging to the given (forgot) habit of practicing them; there is important to assume the "common sense and ordinary language" (and farther following the moral way among stages of development of

<sup>7</sup> *Negative Dialectic (ND)*, 358 *The Adornian imperative regards type of education against barbarity. It is the way to prevent "repetition of Auschwitz" or of something similar" (CM 199: MCP 116). Unfortunately, meanwhile other tragical events have taken place :wars etc. This Adornian negative epistemology shows that rational subjects cannot be sure on the results of their actions in spite of their good intentions. There are just various modes of surviving in a world under the sign of alienation and unfreedom. Adorno thinks that the administrative systems and commodification come to exist for the sake of something else called 'universal fungibility'. (PDM 228) Cultural activities and intellectual pursuits are turned into mere means for the attainment of self-preservation so that it is difficult to see and practise the good. (DA 9-48)*

<sup>8</sup> Karl-Otto Apel (b. 1922) Professor Emeritus at the [University of Frankfurt am Main](#) developed a distinctive approach called "transcendental pragmatics. See: "Transcendental Point of View, Manchester University Press, 1988, ISBN 07190 5538 5 p2-3; see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Otto\\_Apel](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Otto_Apel); also, see: [http://books.google.ro/books?id=Onq7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=communicability+Karl+Otto+Apel&source=bl&ots=4uuLOWDyaY&sig=-eaGSZmMJomBMyOeDp2UdWe7r-A&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=DohOVOi\\_E4TfaL2\\_gdAH&ved=0CDYQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=communicability%20Karl%20Otto%20Apel&f=false](http://books.google.ro/books?id=Onq7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=communicability+Karl+Otto+Apel&source=bl&ots=4uuLOWDyaY&sig=-eaGSZmMJomBMyOeDp2UdWe7r-A&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=DohOVOi_E4TfaL2_gdAH&ved=0CDYQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=communicability%20Karl%20Otto%20Apel&f=false)

<sup>9</sup> Karl-Otto Apel, *From a transcendental-semiotic point of view*, Manchester University Press, ISBN 07190 5384 6

<sup>10</sup> Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) distinguished between the natural and human sciences aiming to arrive at law-based explanations, respectively understanding of human and historical life (*Verstehen/Erklärung*, thus understanding vs. clarifying from the hermeneutic context). By following Kant, he tried to develop a *Critique of Historical Reason* that can do justice to the full scope of lived experience. That meant an inner articulation of the temporal structures of our own experience and the interpretation of the external objectifications of others.

<sup>11</sup> Kind of anti-positivism emphasizing the role of social actions upon man in the direction of Max Weber.

<sup>12</sup> Communicativity regards to different types of communication (between persons, groups, or mixed when it may be used the common sense, the ordinary language, the scientific, categorical-philosophic or the symbolic one. All need a kind of interaction and especially the correct understanding of the meaning. Francisc Jaques is interested on the second context in which an important contribution belongs to Heidegger. See <http://www.history-cluj.ro/SU/anuare/2010/Continut/art26Vidam.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Communicability and its ethics need a "revisited horizon with roots and aims of rationality" for any acceptable. See Teodor Vidam, *Întemeierea eticii comunicării: Francisc Jaques în și față de K-Otto-Apel și J.Habermas*, p. 584 „The exactness of communicability consists in its universality, historicity, semanticity and ethics.”

moral judgments and basic norms of social sciences, as well as a given society<sup>14</sup>; also, the researches on meta-ethics concerning the individual and collective strategies to find the acceptable of economical and political real needs and re-conciliation of the conflict of interests. Even if pessimistic concerning the social institutions (and even concerning the great expectations of Reason whose failure was expressed in tragic events<sup>15</sup>), Adorno believed in the human potential. His ethics of resistance against tyranny of instrumental rationality that keeps man as slave of many temptations offering illusions, can be explained through the sick reason based on the will of power and dominance. Norms of practical ethics regarding concrete situations stay under the sign of the same danger of becoming ideology. Many cases human actions lost their meaning becoming the reflex of the same phenomenon of breaking the balance spirit-soul. This way mind remains without the support of the heart, while heart is troubled by acts and events with little meaning. Even if Adorno follows the Marxist idea of the reification as phenomenon of reducing concrete use-values to abstract exchange-values (of things and persons), it is to be observed that capitalism is only symptomatic of a more fundamental evil whose cause is the form of rationality itself, based on domination. Marx reduced all to economics, but there is also that kind of metaphysical evil explained in Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. By using concepts it is a subtle manner of conquering the world and dominating things and person. Also, it is the old habit of men of trying to change things by changing their names.

## 2. BETWEEN PESIMISM AND OPTIMISM

It is interesting to compare this attitude with the ancient Asian context in which, with a similar point of view on human potential, Confucius advocated for ruling through "li" – traditional customs, mores, and norms – which allowed people to have a sense of shame and became people with good character, rather than through government regulations and penal law. It was the hope that people would the totality of the real, but it may be possible to penetrate the detail, to explode in miniature the mass of merely existing reality."<sup>16</sup> Without being against the enlightenment, Adorno showed its illusions.<sup>17</sup> Some similar ideas may be found yet, at the Romantic writers who had raised against the too vain attitude of the Aufklärer devaluing beauty, spirit and history in favour of a view of man as a soulless machine and a view of the universe as a meaningless, disenchanting void lacking richness and beauty. The non-reflective habit of our mind, and the reflex of the less educated behavior may meet the "idols" of Francis Bacon.<sup>18</sup> Spiritual exercises could help us to have good impulses

<sup>14</sup> E.g. with its given known 10 Commandments, or (Asian) Noble Truths and noble ways or (Arabic) Suwar - prescriptions, respectively (Chinese) action and non-action promoted by the the different understanding of the concepts of wuwei=non-action, li –tradition etc.

<sup>15</sup> See : [Alain Besançon](#), *Le malheur du siècle: Sur le communisme, le nazisme et l'unicité de Shoah*, Librairie Armand Fayard, 1998 / *Nenorocirea secolului, Humanitas*, 2007 , ISBN 978-973-50-1554-1; Also: <http://filme-carti.ro/carti/anatomia-unei-stafii-de-alain-besancon-41656/>

<sup>16</sup> Brian O'Connor, ed. *The Adorno Reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000, p.38.

<sup>17</sup> *Rationality is always endangered under the power of ideologies.*

<sup>18</sup> *The thought of Francis Bacon, thinker of late Renaissance (in transition to modern era) may be found from a letter of 1592 to his uncle, Lord Burghley: "I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends, as I have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers,*

of the Acceptable. Actually, philosophy was a style of life that consisted in the habit of knowing the own role and practising discipline and kind of "intellectual experience". Theodor Adorno used the term "[culture industry](#)" for standardization of cultural goods in order to [manipulate](#) mass society into docility and passivity without chance of reply. That is the case of subjects changed in passive audience exposed "in authoritarian fashion to the same programs put out by different stations". Reminding the image of the *Angel of history* moving backwards into the future with the debris of history piling up around his feet (a picture of Paul Klee analysed by Walter Benjamin) Adorno explained the paradox of technological progress destroying life, because "good life cannot be found in a false one". The Adornian term of "[lifeworld](#)"<sup>19</sup> is used in the theory of communicative action and [discourse ethics](#), which Apel co-developed with [Jürgen Habermas](#).<sup>20</sup> While the explanation of Adorno begins with the type of personality (authoritarian or anti-semitic) developed together with the instrumental rationality, Apel and Habermas think to find solutions in the type of communication. They describe the type of human interests corresponding to type of knowledge and methods of research.

Both John Rawls<sup>21</sup> and Mary Warnock<sup>22</sup> look for a 'non-ideal theory' in which it is to be observed the distinction between 'right' and 'acceptable'. In their opinion *Making Philosophy Acceptable* consists in finding out what is 'the acceptable' as an aspect of the "real world that sets limits on what it is possible to achieve" , while "what is unacceptable

---

*whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations, and verborities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries; the best state of that province. This, whether it be curiosity, or vain glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably) philanthropia, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I do easily see, that place of any reasonable countenance doth bring commandment of more wits than of a man's own; which is the thing I greatly affect." See: Bacon 1857-74, VIII, 109) See: Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, edited by J. Spedding, 7 vols. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts.; <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/>*

<sup>19</sup> The concept appears at [Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology](#) (1936) pp. 108-109: "In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon...existing precisely through this 'living together.' The life-world ( *Lebenswelt*) includes individual, social, perceptual, and practical experiences. It is a term used in [Phenomenology](#), as all that is immediately or directly experienced in the subjectivity of everyday life. It is to be observed the differences from the objective "worlds" of the sciences (characterized by the methods of the mathematical sciences of nature). Although these sciences originate in the life-world, they are not those of everyday life. Phenomenology attempts to discover how that is possible in the context of the givenness: time, space, body, and various aspects of experience. The systemic-constructivist understanding of [Björn Kraus'](#) lifeworld (as „life conditions“ or *Lebenslage* ) covers both individual and social/material perspective in which cognitive development is not at random even if it depends on each person's own reality . See also: <http://www.radpsynet.org/journal/vol1-2/Sloan.html>.

<sup>20</sup> Jürgen Habermas (n. 1929) "the leading systematic philosopher of our time" (as Richard Rorty called him) explained not only the economical crisis but also the crisis of motivation, rationality and legitimacy (Jürgen Habermas, *Cunoaștere și comunicare/Knowledge and communication* ,trans Andrei Marga, Ed. Politica, București , 1983 pp.266-286.

<sup>21</sup> See: John Rawls , *Political Liberalism*, New York : [Columbia University Press](#), 1993. See also: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/>

<sup>22</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary\\_Warnock,\\_Baroness\\_Warnock](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Warnock,_Baroness_Warnock); Mary Warnock insists upon the acceptable rather than the morally right. She sees the acceptable as something that can be changed by various processes, including philosophical reasoning about what would be best.

becomes impossible". [John Rawls](#) assumes his *Theory of Justice* (1971) is compatible with a [liberal](#) conception of the role of justice: namely, that government should be neutral between competing conceptions of the good even there is not a "comprehensive conception of [the good](#)". For him a "theory of the right" is opposed to a theory of the good. Referring to "[overlapping consensus](#)" he thinks that both justice and good appear as acceptable under conditions of reasonable [pluralism](#). It is to find the ways to develop the [public reason](#). Richard Hare<sup>23</sup> criticized Mary Warnock's report on policy-makers as acceptable. Philosophers can help change law and policy in good ways of making visible what is acceptable. We may observe, too, that for the critical theorists following Adorno's critique of culture but still hoping to advance causes of social justice, this seems to bring the utopia in the foundations of emancipatory projects. Deconstruction as an alternative, is not a solution<sup>24</sup>. Theodor Adorno in his *Negative Dialectics*<sup>25</sup>, shows the human habit to use dialectic behind as an explanatory model (e.g. Hegel uses it as the means by which, through contradiction and tension, human history goes on to meet its own spirit as the unfolding of human freedom or world spirit, *Weltgeist*. Each age has its own *zeitgeist* (a sort of temporal appearance as representative of the absolute – e.g. Moses model coming with Ten Commandments; Christian model as God come to Earth); the Prophet of Muslim offering Koran as will of Allah; the Four Noble Truths as essence of Buddhism; or for ones, even Marx promising salvation seen as "marxism"...but, each of those ages -as Hegel observed- is linked and taken up into (*aufgehoben*) the next succeeding one. [Ernst Bloch](#) explains in *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, that "throughout history, and in all cultures, people have dreamed of a better life and constructed various kinds of [utopias](#). Utopian dreams are present in art forms..."<sup>26</sup> Like the role of the play in our lives and along the history as explained by Huizinga<sup>27</sup>, utopian impulses can also be found in many fields of human activity and spirit. While the entire history is seen as a sort of search of some utopias, some of these accounts cover immediate private ends, but maybe the most important ones relates to the end of human suffering. Man's attempts are linked either by absolute destruction

<sup>23</sup> Richard Mervyn Hare ( 1919 2002) , whose [prescriptivism](#) developed as a meta-ethical theory, cleared out that formal features of moral discourse could be used to show that correct moral reasoning would lead most agents to a form of [preference utilitarianism](#). See: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R.\\_M.\\_Hare](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._M._Hare)

<sup>24</sup> Even if there are attempts like Simon Critchley's *The Ethics of Deconstruction*, in connection with Derrida's formal "other" and Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenology of the "Other" as a human face in search of infinite responsibility. Different versions of feminism estimate deconstruction as offering ethical guidance for normative justification (e.g. apparent advocacy of anti-essentialist identity politics). Bernstein has been arguing against the solutions offered by both Habermas and proponents of deconstruction. He emphasizes that Adorno's aesthetic modernism provides the ethical counterpoint to instrumental rationality. See: *The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno* .

<sup>25</sup> *Negative Dialectics* translated by E.B. Ashton. New York: The Seabury Press, 1973. Also *Negative Dialectics*, translated by Dennis Redmond. 2001. See also: [Buck-Morss, Susan](#). *Origin of Negative Dialectics*. Free Press, 1979.

<sup>26</sup> [Ernst Bloch](#), *The Principle of Hope (Das Prinzip Hoffnung)* published in three volumes in 1954, 1955, and 1959; see also <http://www.marxists.org/archive/bloch/hope/introduction.htm>

<sup>27</sup> Johan Huizinga, *Homo ludens*, 1938, 1955, p105 "For archaic man, doing and daring are power, but knowing is a magical power. For him all particular knowledge is sacred knowledge—esoteric and wonder-working wisdom, because any knowing is directly related to the cosmic order itself..."

See also: [http://art.yale.edu/file\\_columns/0000/1474/homo\\_ludens\\_johan\\_huizinga\\_routledge\\_1949\\_.pdf](http://art.yale.edu/file_columns/0000/1474/homo_ludens_johan_huizinga_routledge_1949_.pdf)

or absolute perfection. This position is not a proper one, and Leszek Kołakowski suggests in *Main Currents of Marxism*<sup>28</sup> that Bloch believed that all human knowledge prior to Marx was capable only of describing the past, and could not anticipate the future. Karl Marx troubled a whole century by following an utopia about the liberation of humanity in some form of communist society achieved by the conscious action of the proletariat abolishing the economic domination. In practical intention (famous thesis 11 of Feuerbach), his basic ideas apparently generous, were changed into the ideology with the known price of suffering under totalitarian systems. Theodor Adorno criticized the idea of existence as a unity of all opposites, in which everything has its place and that the tension between these opposites gradually resolves itself into pre-existing whole. In his *Negative Dialectics* showed the unrealized possibilities at both the level of individual and collective psychology in order to overcome suffering. In this context, it is to be understood dialectics as conditioned by contingent events and not by a pre-given endpoint. Even if Adorno's attempt is kind of "transgression against tradition"<sup>29</sup> it is also the view which "emancipated dialectics from types of affirmative essence, without terms of determinacy". Adorno's presupposition is the change of the concept of the foundation. That means self-consciousness must not be based solely in its consummation. Adorno followed his own "intellectual impulses" and feeling linked by the need "to break through the delusion of constitutive subjectivity by means of the power of the subject" in order to "reach stringently across the official division of pure philosophy and what is relevant to the matter [Sachhaltigem] or what is formally scientific"<sup>30</sup>. His theory of negative dialectics, is a long "journey through the icy wasteland of abstraction to concrete philosophizing"<sup>31</sup>. Adorno proposed "models of negative dialectics" to explain what is "relevant" and "simultaneously do justice to the intention of what is at first dealt with generally, out of necessity, in contrast to the usage of examples as something indifferent in themselves."<sup>32</sup> J.M. Bernstein in *Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics*<sup>33</sup> explained the Frankfurt School critique of modernity, where modernization brought kind of standardization and conflicts between scientific rationality and reason which became "the bureaucratic rationalization of practical life in the context of indefinite economic (capital) expansion". In this context, it may be argued that "the disenchantment of the world" and the subsequent

<sup>28</sup> Leszek Kołakowski, (1985). *Main Currents of Marxism* (translated by PS Falla) Volume 3: *The Breakdown*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 425–439. [ISBN 0-19-285109-8](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521622). See especially the chapter about 'the Promethean motif' in Marxism – the idea that it's the destiny of humanity to steal fire from the gods and make the world whatever we want it to be."

<sup>29</sup> He studied the possibilities of "negative dialectics" in relation to several categories, which it preserves as well as qualitatively transforms. Adorno proposed "models of negative dialectics" to explain what is "relevant" and See: Prologue <http://libcom.org/library/negative-dialectics-prologue-theodor-adorno>.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Comments of Walter Benjamin who read Adorno's Metacritique of Epistemology*, written in 1937.

<sup>32</sup> See: Prologue, *ibidem*.

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.amazon.com/Adorno-Disenchantment-Ethics-European-Philosophy/dp/0521622301>. See [J.M. Bernstein](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521622), *Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics*, [Robert B. Pippin](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521622) ed., 2001; also *The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno*, in which he estimates that Adorno's aesthetic modernism provides the ethical counterpoint to instrumental rationality.

"destruction of aura"<sup>34</sup> brings disasters in history and "has left a gap in contemporary ethical thought." Thus losing aura means the erosion of high culture. For Benjamin, that will open the way to a political form of art.<sup>35</sup> Speaking of aura, also Adorno refers to concrete particularity against identity thinking, described in terms of universal commodification. The lifeworld is reduced to money, commodification, and our judges as kind of slogans of the daily advertisement. This way, we meet "desacralising" processes of modern civilization. *In art, for instance, it is to be observed the decline of its cultic function: [The contemporary decay of the aura] rests on two circumstances, both of which are related to the increasing significance of the masses in contemporary life. Namely, the desire of contemporary masses to bring things "closer" spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent towards overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction.*<sup>36</sup>

### CONCLUSION

If H. Putnam meditated upon the criteria of the value of rationality itself, *-in Reason, Truth and History*<sup>37</sup> - that could be the beginning of the new understanding between means and aims because the acceptable would mean not only cognitive rationality but added justification through social practice. Reason itself wouldn't be an ordinary space in the process of obtaining a certain object or a certain result, thus neither an instrument, nor an at random means, but an acceptable in the circle of the relevant values. For Adorno, the "splinter in your eye is the best magnifying glass,"<sup>38</sup> makes known kind of contemporary blindness and oblivion in front of the last great human tragedies like those described by [Alain Besançon](#) in *Le malheur du siècle*.<sup>39</sup> James Gordon Finlayson in his attempt to recall the main ideas of the Adornian practical ethics, finds some affinities between Adorno's philosophical negativism and apophatic (or negative) theology.<sup>40</sup> He observes that Adorno speaks about the contemporary world as being a false one, in which there is no way of doing (and knowing) the morally or politically right thing.<sup>41</sup> The processes which were supposed to liberate man from

<sup>34</sup>Walter Benjamin's notion of "aura" helps to find a way of identifying that quality of numinousness, traditionally acknowledged to be characteristic of the authentic work of art. As he writes in *The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproducibility* (abbrev. WA): "We define the aura of [a natural object] as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it might be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon, or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch." (WA 224-25 (216). In this context the aura as a quality of our experience of objects, not necessarily restricted to the products of artistic creation may become something else in the case of the work of art: an exalted quality ("cult-value" in the terms of the author) is closely tied to the religious art - a remnant of that association between art and religion characteristic of pre-modern society.

<sup>35</sup> Adorno's objection raised to make distinction between art and propaganda. See: <https://www.scribd.com/doc/211237807/Adorno-Benjamin-And-the-Excessive-Politics-of-Aura>

<sup>36</sup> WA 225 (217), BGS I.2 479-80) v11.

<sup>37</sup> Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, 1987 p.184

<sup>38</sup> Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, Art 2007; <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1951/mm/>

<sup>39</sup> [Alain Besançon](#), in *Le malheur du siècle, Sur le communisme, le nazisme et l'unicité de la Shoah*, Librairie Arteme Fayard, 1998; *Nenorocirea secolului*, (Romanian trans.), Humanitas 1999.

<sup>40</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophatic\\_theology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophatic_theology).

<sup>41</sup> To sum the main Adornian ideas, we quote his thesis: "There is no way of living a false life correctly" (MM 39) [*Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im Falschen*] (GS 4 p.43)] Adorno thinks that the social world is radically evil.

subjugation by external nature ,actually imprison them in a network of technological manipulation and administrative social control .<sup>42</sup> If the social world is radically evil in the sense described above, there can be no correct living in it, namely because all the available options are covert forms of internal and external domination and control. Even in the absence of the good (as Augustine speaks about the longing to conceive the thing, actually it is in subtle relation with what is thought only in the absence of images)<sup>43</sup>, even in the absence of any positive conception of the good, practical resistance to the bad is possible.<sup>44</sup> Hagerman's model comes in the context of the connection between social change, the subjective sense of meaningfulness, and mental health in modern society<sup>45</sup>,but it seems to fail in the utopia and hope that communication in the "public sphere without compulsion" could change the "inner man", or the character .

Teodor Vidam, one of the greatest Romanian thinkers who promotes a new school of ethics , meditates on the human being rested between the search of happiness and the moral skepticism. He observes the real need of communicative rationality and that Apel improved Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action while discussing the transcendental-pragmatic conditions of communication. If Habermas construes a "weak transcendentalism" in connection with empirical social inquiry, Apel<sup>46</sup> explains in *Transformation der Philosophie* (1973) a pragmatic contradiction (through an emphasis on the mediation and the configuring power of language) describing the language analysis as a foundation for any rational human enterprise.<sup>47</sup>

Joseph Ratzinger thought the moral problem of our time: "At one hand, it is built a mondial society in which the distinct powers -politic,economic and cultural- ask more and

---

(DA 171, HTS 62), 'radically evil' (ND 374 & 23; MCP 114-5)He thinks that whole social world does not know the good (ND 128; DE xv, DA 5 ND 128 ;MCP 101 & 104; MCP 101,104,116.)

<sup>42</sup> DA 7-42. Adorno thinks we can have no positive conception of the good. The good (sometimes called 'reconciliation', 'redemption', 'happiness' and 'utopia') cannot be thought.

<sup>43</sup>Such an absence reminds us the theological teaching on graven images and materialism secularises it It is the sense of Adornian negative epistemology.Utopias are not allowed to be pictured positively. Because "to conceive is to identify", we have neither the possibility to represent or picture the good, utopia a.s.o. nor to conceive it. That is why the concepts are tools of thought following the interest of controlling external nature.As to form a concept of what is good (e.g. life intrinsically as value )is to transform it into something else.Even the aim is self-preservation,the attempt to cover its uniqueness , good life is falsified by losing its uniqueness. (ND 207)

<sup>44</sup> PDM 249

<sup>45</sup>Visit the argument between Frank and Pomo,two imaginary characters <http://www.radpsynet.org/journal/vol1-2/Sloan.html>. In short, Frank is an imaginary student whos thought is in debt to Habermas and Herbert Marcuse and psychoanalytic object-relations theory. Pomo ( an imaginary character,too) is interested on the problems of postmodernism.

<sup>46</sup> This case he appears as adversary of so-called "critical rationalism" of [Karl Raimund Popper](#).

<sup>47</sup> See especially *Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft* (the 2nd vol.) and *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy* (Marquette Studies in Philosophy, No 20), by Karl-Otto Apel, (trans. Glyn Adey and David Fisby), Milwaukee, Marquette University Press,1998.

more one another, while their impact space is narrower in a mutual work. At the other hand, it is to be observed the man possibilities of action, the power to construe and to destroy. These possibilities need the ethic and juridic control beyond the known limit."<sup>48</sup> In this context, it is necessary to make clear their connections, understand the large power of destroying and the danger of terrorism, sometimes pretending religious causes. This case the state of religion is to get the same urgency concerning the Acceptable. Also, the doctrina of human rights and liberties should be improved in a new understanding of the acceptable as responsibility, duty and consciousness of our limits. It should pay attention to the tensions between North and South, between spheres of political or religious influence, between economical and cultural spheres and their contradictions. The danger of our time consists in the fact that the dependence of men and peoples one another has not an adequate ethical interaction of conscience and mind of the implied agents. From such a correlation would come a real development. Actually that means to find the acceptable and reject what is not acceptable. The criterion of making difference is the respect of life and truth. This respect brings responsibility and charity and modesty. These are some valuable values of the acceptable. It is an urgency of education to make them known and create the habit of practicing them. The next political leaders should be prepared and trained since the yearly age to know what the acceptable is, and concrete meditation on how could it be practiced in managing situations of crisis. This is an attempt of recovering the story of Philosophy as Snow White. It is difficult to find the seven dwarfs, but Adorno could be seen as The King Hunter of The Acceptable in History.

## REFERENCES

1. **Apel, Karl-Otto**, "Transcendental Point of View", Manchester University Press, 1988, ISBN 07190 5538 5
2. **Apel Karl-Otto**, "From a transcendental-semiotic point of view, Manchester University Press, 1998 ISBN 07190 5384 6, 9780719053849
3. **Adorno, Theodor**, "Minima Moralia" (trans. Andrei Cornea), Art 2007, ISBN 978-073-124-098-5
4. **Adorno, Theodor W.**, "[Negative Dialectics](#)" (trans by E.B. Ashton), New York: The Seabury Press, 1973.
5. **Adorno, Theodor W.** "Problems of Moral Philosophy" ( trans. Rodney Livingstone, edited by Thomas Schroder ), Polity Press, 2001
6. **Banu I. and A. Piathkowski**, *Filosofia greacă până la Platon, vol II, 2nd part p 447-523 trans, introductions and notes*, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, București 1984
7. **Besançon, Alain**, *Nenorocirea secolului, Humanitas*, 2007, ISBN 978-973-50-1554-1
8. **Marga, Andrei**, "Valori ferme în modernitatea târzie, Introducere în [Jürgen Habermas](#), Joseph Ratzinger, *Dialectica secularizării. Despre națiune și religie*", *Apostrof*, 2005
9. **Vidam, Teodor** "Filosofia morale încotro?" (Moral Philosophy -Where? ), 2014.
10. **Vidam, Teodor** "Teritoriul moralității" (The Moral Territory ), 2014.

<sup>48</sup> Marga, Andrei, Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Ratzinger, *Dialectica secularizării. Despre rațiune și credință (Dialectics of Secularisation. Reason and Faith)*, pp. 101-111

**ABBREVIATIONS** Theodor W. Adorno

CM=Adorno, T.W. *Critical Models* (tr. H. Pickford), New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

AE= *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique* (trans) W. Domingo. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983.

AGS = *Gesammelte Schriften* (ed) R. Tiedemann. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1970-97.

AT=Aesthetic Theory (ed & trans. R. Hullot-Kentor), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

MCP=Adorno, T.W. *Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

AT= *Aesthetic Theory* (tr. R. Hullot-Kentor), London: Athlone Press, 1997

ÄT= Adorno, T.W. *Ästhetische Theorie*, (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1990

PDM= Adorno, T.W. *Probleme der Moralphilosophie*, ed. T. Schröder (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1997).

HTS =Adorno, T.W., *Hegel: Three Studies* (tr. S. Weber-Nicholson), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993

MM= Adorno, T.W. *Minima Moralia*, London: Verso, 1991

ND= Adorno, T.W. *Negative Dialektik*, Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1973

NL1=Adorno, T.W. *Notes on Literature*, vol. 1, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

GS4=Adorno, T.W. *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, ed. R. Tiedemann (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1970).

DA= Adorno, T.W. & Horkheimer, M. *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Frankfurt a/M: S. Fischer Verlag GmbH, 1969

H= *Hegel: Three Studies* (trans) S.W. Nicholson. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

JA= *The Jargon of Authenticity* (trans) K. Tarnowski & F. Will. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

NL1= *Notes to Literature*, vol. 1 (trans. S.W. Nicholson), New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

NL2= *Notes to Literature*, vol. 2 (trans. S.W. Nicholson), New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

NS= *Nachgelassene Schriften*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1993–.

P= *Prisms* (trans) S. Weber & S. Weber. Cambridge: MIT, 1983.

PMM= *The Philosophy of Modern Music* Q= *Quasi una Fantasia* (trans R. Livingstone), New York: Continuum, 1992.

MM= *Minima Moralia* (trans. E.F.N. Jephcott), New York: London: Verso, 1978.

Mm= Adorno, Theodor, "Minima Moralia" (trans. Andrei Cornea), Art 2007

ND= *Negative Dialectics* (trans. E.B. Ashton. London: Routledge, 1973.

NIR=Korsgaard, Christine M. 'The Normativity of Instrumental Reason' in *Ethics and Practical Reason* (eds. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.